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ABSTRACT
Statement of the Problem: Why did the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional
Officers form as an independent union in 1971, and how did it develop over time and
achieve its goals within a conservative labor climate? What does its history reveal
about Rhode Island labor history and the broader trends in the American labor history
since 1970?
Methodology or Procedures:
This study utilized the personal recollections of labor leaders, lawyers,
administrative officials, and other key individuals who were present during the most
crucial events throughout the union’s history. The union also had a great wealth of
documents to be examined. Newspaper archives (such as the Providence Journal) and
state records were used to paint a broader picture and give greater context to the events.
These were all compared to the existing historiography surrounding labor since the
1970’s and was examined within the context of larger trends in labor established by
other historians. Secondary source material regarding corrections itself was utilized to
give greater meaning to changes regarding the nature of the work of correctional
officers.
Findings:
The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers formed in 1971 as an
independent union in response to inadequate representation and dangerous working
conditions. While other unions fell apart during the latter half of the 1970’s and the
labor movement fell into a general state of disillusionment, RIBCO gained strength and
momentum due to the increased funding for the prisons and the independent nature of

the union itself. RIBCO was able to utilize the press to gain the sympathies of the
citizens of Rhode Island, making them more willing to pass bond issues that would
help to improve their working conditions within the facilities. The union engaged in
various job actions and public discussions to make the dangers of their job known to
the general public. In the 1980’s, the judiciary of Rhode Island took an active role in
bringing more funding into the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI). Throughout the
1980’s, relations between the officers and management (under the effective leadership
of Corrections Director John Moran) improved greatly as they began to work together
more frequently to solve the problems of the prison. The union grew in strength and
became a force to be reckoned with. Throughout the 1980s, the union engaged in
aggressive bargaining in various contract negotiations which improved its pay scale
and benefits, helping it to resolve some of its issues from the 1970s. In 1991, with a
riot in the maximum security building, the officers (with the support of the
administration) took back complete control of maximum security. This was a turning
point for the ACI and the officers’ union as they attained a safe working environment.
The union realized all of its goals from the early 1970s, unlike most other unions of
that time period.
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PREFACE
This study will examine the innermost workings of the Rhode Island Brotherhood
of Correctional Officers (RIBCO) during its forty years of its existence (from 19712011). It will work to answer the questions: How did the Rhode Island Brotherhood
of Correctional Officers form as an independent union? How has it developed over
time and achieved its goals within a conservative labor climate? What does its history
reveal about Rhode Island labor history and the broader trends in the American labor
history since 1970?
This union will be placed within a broader context of labor since the 1970’s. As
public sector labor was gathering strength throughout the 1970’s (and manufacturing
unions began to decline), workers within the public sector sought representation that
better suited their needs. RIBCO formed as an independent union to deal specifically
with the challenges regarding work within a prison atmosphere, a highly specialized
field. In forming an independent union, RIBCO managed to escape the backslide that
unions, represented by larger labor organizations, faced as the era of conservatism hit.
RIBCO is an interesting case study with regard to labor since the 1970’s and a great
example of how the goals of the 1970’s became reality for some independently
organized unions, like RIBCO. This study will also examine how the Rhode Island
Brotherhood of Correctional Officers Union compares to other unions within the same
time frame and will be used to analyze general trends within the labor movement at
the time of its formation and since. It will include the contributions (such as the
establishment of a competent labor force and its role in the progress of prison reform)

v

that the Brotherhood has made to the state of Rhode Island and the state penitentiary
system through interviews and a close examination of archival materials. This is an
important study with regard to labor in Rhode Island and it also gives voice to a
workforce that is not usually examined. In addition to this, a study surrounding the
history of a very prominent public sector union within Rhode Island has many
implications during a time of fiscal crisis for the entire nation. Rhode Island’s public
union sector is currently under attack and an understanding of the history of these
unions is crucial and necessary in creating a constructive path forwards.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
This work will address the following questions: Why did the Rhode Island
Brotherhood of Correctional Officers form as an independent union in 1971, and how
did it develop over time and achieve its goals within a conservative labor climate? It
will also determine what this union’s history reveals about Rhode Island labor history
and broader trends in American labor history since 1970.
The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers was founded on
December 17, 1970 by one hundred and sixteen men in the lobby of the Adult
Corrections Institution of Rhode Island. They were fed up with the hazardous nature
of their work, the low pay, and the constant chaos that surrounded them on a daily
basis. They were in search of representation that suited needs that were specific to the
nature of their work. Previously, they had been affiliated with the Local 114 of the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, but this union was
not organized in a way that responded to their unique and precarious situation. Their
union representatives did not understand the specialized nature of their work or the
precarious situation that they were all placed in every day.
At a time when the country was experiencing an increasing level of labor
militancy (with regard to the exponentially increasing number of organized strikes and
wildcat strikes, internal union restructuring, and demands for a more democratic
workplace), the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers decided to break
away from the traditional labor organization and form an independent union. This
union sought to make the prison a safe environment to work in and to increase pay and
1

benefits. Its members created a lasting labor entity that would withstand the tests of
time. In the latter part of the 1970’s, other attempts at labor organizing began to
crumble and the labor movement fell into a state of disillusionment as workers
realized they were not meeting their goals. Corporations and state officials engaged in
highly effective union busting tactics. The labor movement failed to harness the
democratic sentiments of its rank and file and did not institute more democratic
practices. The highest levels of union organization (ie. AFL-CIO) missed an
opportunity to merge with broader social and economic movements, such as the
modern phase of the civil rights movement or the women’s rights movement, and thus
failed to achieve greater collective bargaining power or any broader social goals
regarding dignity and economic equality. The more radical elements of unions were
expelled and the labor movement fractured. RIBCO, however, won small struggles
and continued to grow as a labor organization. The union gained strength and
momentum due to the increased funding for the prisons and the independent nature of
the union itself. RIBCO was able to utilize the press to gain the sympathies of the
citizens of Rhode Island, making them more willing to pass bond issues that would
help to improve their working conditions within the facilities. The union engaged in
various job actions and public discussions to make the dangers of their job known to
the general public. At times, winning just meant surviving as an organization and
living to fight the battles of another day. However, as time passed, the union
developed into one of the most powerful and effective public sector unions within the
state of Rhode Island. Its members worked together to create a brotherhood, in the
truest sense of the word. They banded together and refused to allow another officer to
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die within the prison. Like family, they watched out for one another and protected one
another.
While many unions did not endure the 1970’s or the conservative atmosphere of
the 1980’s, RIBCO continued to persevere and work towards achieving their goals, in
the distinctive way that only they could carry off. This was an age of racial strife, in
which African Americans viewed themselves the “object of racial discrimination in
every area of institutional life.”1 This often resulted in violent outbursts against the
officers. This was the age of conservatism, in which it became popular for politicians
to crackdown on public sector unions. RIBCO answered all of these challenges with
appeals to the public through the press and appeals to management. Relations
between the officers and management improved greatly as they began to work
together more frequently to solve the problems of the prison. The union grew in
strength and became a force to be reckoned with. Throughout the 1980s, the union
engaged in aggressive bargaining in various contract negotiations which improved its
pay scale and benefits, helping it to resolve some of its issues from the 1970s. RIBCO
maintained a public presence and managed to unite with the administration and the
public to finally create a path to stability and order.
In April of 1991, the prisoners engaged in an all-out riot that would damage the
facilities and severely test the resolve of the prison administration and the officers.
However, the officers, administration, and public had now begun to work together as a
cohesive unit to finally put an end to the chaotic atmosphere of the Rhode Island prison
system. Finally, the officers took back maximum security and were working within a

1

Leo Carroll, Hacks, Blacks, and Cons : Race Relations in a Maximum Security Prison, Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974, 115.
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system that was safer and a system in which they were valued. This was a turning
point for the ACI and the officers’ union as they attained a safe working environment.
The union realized all of its goals from the early 1970s, unlike most other unions of
that time period. As the Brotherhood celebrates its fortieth anniversary, it is clear that
they have withstood the test of time and had met the goals that they had set in the
1970’s, when most other public sector unions had given up.
This study will utilize the personal recollections of labor leaders, lawyers, prison
administrative officials, and other key individuals who were present during the most
crucial events throughout the union’s history. Traditional oral history methodology
will be used. Newspaper archives (such as the Providence Journal) and state records
will also be used to paint a broader picture and give greater context to the events.
These will all be compared to the existing historiography surrounding labor since the
1970’s to find correlations and to trends in labor established by other historians.
Secondary source material regarding corrections itself will also be utilized to give
greater meaning to changes regarding the nature of the work of correctional officers.
This thesis will be broken into three major parts. The first deals with the
origins of the union and its early struggles of the 1970’s. The second discusses
formative era between 1971 and 1977, in which the union identified its major goals
and began to work to achieve them. The third section focuses on the 1980’s and
1990’s and demonstrates how the conservative era of politics shaped this union and
how the union has now achieved its original goals. To conclude, this will discuss the
present circumstances of the prison and the union and how RIBCO fits into the labor
picture of Rhode Island today.

4

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The historiography since the 1970s with regard to correctional officers’ unions,
and the labor movement in general, has not been not well developed or closely
examined. There are two strands of material that will be examined for this thesis: the
first surrounds post-war labor history and the second surrounds the correctional system
itself. An analysis of post-war labor trends is necessary to fitting RIBCO into a
broader schema. In analyzing these trends, a study of the system of corrections is
needed to understand the nature of the work of the correctional officers and how it is
affected by trends in the labor movement.
In general, historians paint a picture in which labor had a great deal of
optimism which stemmed from the post-war labor mentality and manifested itself
within the early 1970’s. World War II was a struggle for victory abroad and victory at
home with regard to the advantages of democracy being available to all. In the
immediate post-war era, union members demanded that their organizations represent
these values and fight for an economic climate that benefited all, regardless of class or
race. Unions struggled to get through the tarnish of the communist image and yet also
tried to maintain a level of liberalism and equality inherent within their movement.
All of the increased class and racial consciousness came to a head in the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s. The labor movement reached a pivotal moment in the early 1970’s
and they set many goals for themselves which included traditional goals (regarding
steady employment and wages), and less traditional goals (regarding more humane
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labor conditions and being treated with dignity). These goals were left by the wayside
in the mid-1970’s with the nation’s increasing financial difficulties and the inability of
the labor movement to reach beyond racial and ethnic divisions as well as divisions
regarding the types of labor to fight for a common economic cause. The goals of the
early 1970’s have still not been realized for most unions.
The CIOs Left-led Unions puts forth the view that race and Communism are the
two major factors working against the more radical elements of the labor movement
during the Cold War. This collection, edited by Steven Rosswurm in 1992, is a post-war
labor history. The labor movement was fragmented due to the debate over which kinds
of people to include within the unions. If the CIO continued to include more radical,
Communist and Socialist followers within their organization, it believed that it would
lose legitimacy within the labor movement as a whole. As a result, eleven unions were
expelled from the CIO during its convention of 1949.2
Racial inequality played a crucial role in the expulsions. The CIO was still
struggling with the kinds of workers it wanted to represent: skilled (represented by a
narrow margin of society) or unskilled (more racially diverse). At this time, workplace
diversity was discouraged and there were fewer economic opportunities available to
minority groups.3 The CIO, in an attempt to maintain its legitimacy with the American
public, sought to create a more moderate tone by eliminating its more radical and
diverse factions.4 This collection’s intent is to suggest that the labor movement might
have changed direction or perhaps been more successful, had it incorporated these

2

Steve Rosswurm, The CIO's Left-led Unions (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1992),
119-138.
3
Rosswurm, 69-94.
4
Rosswurm, 139-158.
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members.5 The CIO could have maintained its solidarity and strengthened its stance
instead of weakening their position in the hopes that they would gain allies. This
created a bitter splintering of the labor movement which it has still not recovered from.
In The State and Labor in Modern America (1994), Melvyn Dubofsky stresses
that the power of the working-class people is exaggerated, which is a response to the
surrounding historiography that deviates from traditional trends and counters the ideas
of other historians (as seen in Rosswurm’s collection of articles). He argues that
historians have spent too much time emphasizing “ethnicity, gender, race, shop-floor
traditions, and discursive ideologies”.6 He argues for a broadened perspective that deals
with “patterns of trade union growth and decline” and “the persistent dominance of
capital in its relations with labor”.7 He points to the fact that unions, after 1983,
continued to lose millions of members and made many concessions despite an upturn in
the American economy.8 Dubofsky examines what he terms “tangible labor policies”
instead of changes in national values.9 He traces the patterns of national labor policy
and the development of state intervention with regard to labor from the 1870’s up
through the early 1990’s.
The post-war period is one in which Dubofsky suggests that labor carried within
itself “the seeds of its own destruction”.10 While the system appeared to be functioning
beautifully on the surface, it was headed for disaster as a result of internal and external
stressors. The Hartley-Taft Act of 1947 set back national labor policy by banning
5

Rosswurm, 1-17.
Melvyn Dubofsky, The State & Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina
Press, 1994), xi.
7
Dubofsky, xi.
8
Dubofsky, xii.
9
Dubofsky, xiii.
10
Dubofsky, 198.
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closed shop, restraining the establishment of union shops, allowing federal courts to
issue antistrike injunctions, and letting states reject all forms of union security (through
laws such as “Right to Work” laws which made it illegal to keep union membership as a
condition for employment).
With the addition of African Americans and women to the workforce and
unions, public resistance against the movement grew through the 1950’s and 1960’s.
The AFL-CIO (which merged in 1955) found itself conflicting with civil rights
legislation. Traditionally labor restricted access to craft unions to skilled workers only
to maintain bargaining power. In maintaining a monopoly of the skilled workforce,
labor could easily control big business. In reality, this discriminated against minorities
(with regard to race and gender) who largely made up the unskilled workforce. While
labor endorsed these laws and fundamentally agreed with the principles contained
therein, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin) helped to destroy
their solidarity as a bargaining unit. The economic shocks of the 1970’s dismantled the
economic stability the nation had enjoyed and did nothing to help the cause of labor.
Labor could no longer depend on the federal government to intervene on their behalf.
The times became increasingly conservative. Trade unions failed to reform labor law.
It became clear that labor could not defeat the economic and political problems facing
it.11
Labor historians have not given the 1980’s much study and the historiography
surrounding this era is lacking. Jonathan D. Rosenblum, in Copper Crucible (written in
1995), takes a case study approach to labor in using the Arizona’s miners’ strike of 1983
11

Dubofsky, 195-238.
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and asserts that this strike changed labor-management relations throughout the country
as a whole. This book helps to give insight to labor as a whole during the early 1980’s
and paints a picture of how relationships between management and labor became much
more aggressive and the spirit of cooperation had disappeared. This statewide strike
was held against the Phelps Dodge Corporation, a titan in the copper mining industry. It
started on June 30, 1983 when twenty four hundred mine workers became enraged by
cuts in wages, medical benefits, and vacation time. Phelps Dodge refused to accept
terms that other corporations in the copper mining industry were accepting and used
federal labor laws to back up its actions.12
Labor now had a slew of roadblocks in its way, and situations often escalated to
the point of violence. The press had a crucial role in swaying public opinion during this
tough economic time.13 Physical force, once employed by the companies themselves,
was now being provided by the government and was done with the blessing of the
taxpayers (keeping in line with the conservative mentality of the time). When the
corporation did not get the governor to bring in the National Guard, it was forced to shut
down. They took the issue to the state legislature and used their lobbying powers to
pass legislation in favor of the strikebreakers. 14 When it became clear that the company
would use the strikebreakers to reopen, the governor realized that this situation would
escalate. 15 He called in the National Guard to keep the peace but violence broke out.16
In the end, it was the federal judicial system that killed the strike in 1986 with an appeal

12

Jonathan D. Rosenblum, Copper Crucible : How the Arizona Miners' Strike of 1983 Recast Labormanagement Relations in America (Ithaca, N.Y. : ILR Press, 1995), 3-4.
13
Rosenblum, 85-88.
14
Rosenblum, 96-103.
15
Rosenblum, 107.
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Rosenblum, 108-109.
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to the National Labor Relations Board. The union was decertified based on the fact that
the union members had been replaced.17 This was a move that was not in line with the
tradition of the National Labor Relations Board. It became clear that union strength had
taken a hard hit with regard to the right to strike and worker solidarity.18 Once public
opinion had turned, the full force of each branch of government, at different levels, was
used to break apart union power. This book makes clear the destructive power an
economic downturn has on labor. This strike became a “symbol of defeat for American
unions”.19
While most authors view the external stressors as being the major obstacles for
unions, historian Jefferson Cowie presents the internal divisions as being the most
important obstacle of all. “Portrait for the Working Class in a Convex Mirror: Toward a
History of the Seventies”, written by Cowie in 2005, re-examines labor in the 1970’s
with a different approach. This author argues that the real struggle within the labor
movement was over class divisions. This argument demonstrates a clear shift in the
historiography. In focusing on class divisions as the central problem within the labor
movement, Cowie stresses a grassroots interpretation of the movement that is more
inclusive and offers a fresh approach on the material and problems therein. The author
explains this decade as “a bridge between eras”.20 While the first half of the era (within
the early 1970’s) suggested a great amount of progress and promise for workers, the
second half (the latter part of the 1970’s into the 1980’s) was disappointing in its

17

Rosenblum, 195-199.
Rosenblum, 217.
19
Rosenblum, 217.
20
Jefferson Cowie, "Portrait of the Working Class in a Convex Mirror: Toward a History of the
Seventies." (Labor: Studies in Working Class History of the Americas 2, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 93-102.
America: History & Life, EBSCOhost (accessed February 23, 2011)), 93.
18
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regression and recognition of limits. Cowie asserts that as economic inequality
skyrocketed during this decade, discussions about class conflict and the issues of the
lower classes dwindled. Economic growth slowed and unemployment rose and yet
Americans were hesitant to tackle their demons. Political identity shifted away from
economic status. Historians, according to Cowie, should investigate this gap between
“the politics of economic reality and the politics of identity and imagery”.21
Within the political realm, standing up to public sector unions “became the
litmus test of a politician’s sense of fiscal responsibility”.22 The public questioned
spending and, at least within the public sector, it no longer became feasible to replace
striking workers. This tactic was used much more within private business, as private
business did not have the public sentiment to contend with. 23 Major impediments to
unions during the 1970’s were labor consultants and lobbying operations. These were
critical factors that worked to defeat specific unions and helped to end labor law reform
in Congress.24 This directly contradicts authors like Dubofsky who argued that the
federal bureaucracy was the only thing working to protect workers during this time
period. Cowie also states that the distance between union members and the rest of the
American public grew and both groups lost touch with one another.25
In a more recent work, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970’s and the Last Days of the
Working Class (2010), Cowie uses various cases across the nation in various types of
industries to develop the idea of class divisions within the labor movement and how the
dialogue regarding class changes with the new conservative era. He views it as a
21

Cowie, “Portrait of the Working Class”, 97.
Cowie, “Portrait of the Working Class”, 98.
23
Cowie, “Portrait of the Working Class”, 96-98.
24
Cowie, “Portrait of the Working Class”, 99.
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22

11

movement that was reaching towards specific goals (including more humane conditions
and being treated with dignity) and yet never quite ended up attaining them. The
democratic mentality of the nation’s unionized workforce broke down with racial
integration and an economy that was in turmoil.26 Therefore, labor’s actions became “a
conflicted set of movements” and the cohesiveness of spirit and ideology seen at the
beginning of the decade began to disintegrate.27 This ended the decade with a period of
disillusionment and demoralization and the vision of the labor movement was lost.
Cowie analyzes the problems of the 1960’s and early 1970’s and how workers
initially were on the right track to identifying them and fixing them. The demands of
workers in the seventies as included: union democracy, a good quality of work life,
health and safety at the workplace, and a desire for fresh leadership. 28 He uses examples
such as the inactivity of the United Mine Workers Association during a situation in
which many miners were trapped within Consolidated Coal mines in Farmington West
Virginia (in 1968). This inactivity proved how out of touch labor leadership could be
with the needs of the workers they represented.29 Union leadership (now part of an
economic elite) was also faulted for not rising to meet the social demands of its workers
that surfaced in the 1960’s. At the beginning of the 1970’s three things became clear to
workers: they could work outside of the union bureaucracy to achieve their goals, the
young workers were more discontent as time went on, and the federal government was
clearly getting in the way with its business-backed law.30 Union members wished to

26

Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970’s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York : New
Press, 2010), 3-7.
27
Cowie, Stayin’Alive, 7.
28
Cowie, Stayin’Alive, 24.
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Cowie, Stayin’Alive, 30.
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have a union that encompassed a greater diversity of workers.31 The economic and
political climate changed and this, in turn, helped to change the tides of the national
labor discourse.32 Race, gender, sexuality, and religion “were eclipsing class as points
of reference in political life”.33
As the seventies drew to a close, it seemed to many that “workers’ sense of
entitlement” and “union power” were “at the root of the nation’s problems”.34
Stagflation and the energy crisis helped to create a sense of collective panic and
corporations organized and rebounded from the attack by labor. Corporations utilized
political action committees and pushed for more anti-union legislation now that public
opinion had clearly taken a turn against labor.35 The Supreme Court moved to sanctify
these legal actions. Finally, President Ronald Reagan helped to ultimately reverse all of
the gains made in the 1970’s with his strikebreaking tactics, as evidenced by his
showdown with the Air Traffic Controllers. Cowie sees the Reagan presidency as
something that “devastated the workingman”.36 All around, there was disparity and a
lack of class consciousness coupled with the sense that an opportunity was lost.
In order to understand how trends in labor history relate to RIBCO, the
historiography surrounding the development of the penology system is needed to
understand the nature of the work of a correctional officer and how it is thus affected by
labor trends. Analysis of the development of the American penology system is
necessary when studying the nature of work within American prisons. In general, the

31
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Cowie, Stayin’Alive, 75-167.
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Cowie, Stayin’Alive, 216.
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prison system is seen as a mechanism by which to control segments of the population
that are unsavory. Throughout its evolution, it has become increasingly more
bureaucratic and political. Within Rhode Island, this has held also true.
Michel Foucault, French historian and philosopher, examined theories around
punishment and how it has developed over time. In the book Discipline and Punish: the
Birth of the Prison, Foucault traces the roots of the prison system from medieval times
and explains the motivations of those who helped to shape the system throughout the
ages. The aim of punishment was to deter crime and to apply ideas of reason to justice,
with individualized correction also being a major facet of this new way of administering
justice.37 An entirely new system developed to accommodate this punishment. Out of
this came a need for organization and discipline. The space of the prison became highly
regulated and monitored and the activities within that space were strictly regimented.38
Foucault describes the organization of systems of separation for means of “surveillance
and control” which helped to expand the power of rulers.39 This led to the branding and
isolation of groups that did not follow the normal mainstream inclinations. Usually, the
constant observation was enough to keep prisoners in check and keep the supervisor in a
dominant position. Actual threats were not necessary. In addition to this, troublesome
segments of the population were split apart and kept from uniting to overthrow the
powers that be.40 This also allowed for experiments to be performed on various human
subjects.41 One could argue that these experiments could take various forms, such as the

37

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Random House: New York, New
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“reforming” and “rehabilitative” programs that exist in present day society. This system
gave the public the right to come in and inspect it at will so that it would not become a
tyrannical system.42 The system was designed, not only to control those within the walls
of the prison, but also those outside within the larger realm of society.43
Foucault then delves into the greater consolidation of policing powers
throughout the eighteenth century and into the modern age. This created a system in
which there was a “codified power to punish” and “the universal punishments of the law
are applied selectively to certain individuals and always the same ones”.44 The author
makes the disturbing point that prisons resemble “factories, schools, barracks, hospitals,
which all resemble prisons”.45 It is clear that Foucault views the prison system as a
system which just increases the power of those in the upper echelons of society and
perpetuates itself in a manner that works to further control those who are in the lower
rungs of the societal ladder. Prisons then act as breeding grounds for delinquency, in
that they do not actually seek to solve the problem of crime, yet help to perpetuate it.46
Prisons are rooted in power and are perpetuated by elements seeking to maintain their
power within the larger society.
American Penology: A History of Control by Thomas Blomberg examines the
expansion correctional system throughout the course of American history and also
asserts that this is a way for the government to keep an increasing amount of control
over the American population. The book’s greatest strength is that it examines the
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“specific historical conditions” surrounding each “penal reform era”.47 The book
examines the penal system from the 1600’s to 2009.
With regard to the penology system in Rhode Island, the works of Leo Carroll
are invaluable. Hacks, Blacks, and Cons : Race Relations in a Maximum Security
Prison, written in 1974 studies the Rhode Island prison system, from the prisoners’
perspective at a crucial point in the history of the Brotherhood of Correctional officers.
Largely this work is crucial in gaining the perspective of the prisoner population,
specifically with regard to race and reforms. This is part of that body of work and helps
to describe conditions, policies, and reforms within the ACI during a crucial era in the
union’s formation.
Lawful Order : a Case Study of Correctional Crisis and Reform written by Leo
Carroll in 1998 explains some of the reforms which were undertaken within the Rhode
Island prison system and connects these reforms to the broader reform movements
going on throughout America at the same time. This is a critical work in that needs to
be reviewed in examining state intervention within the prisons, on behalf of the
prisoners. Carroll examines how the reform efforts of the judiciary changed the
system within the state of Rhode Island. He asserts that Rhode Island was very
different from other states in which judicial reforms have been instituted in that: there
was no capital punishment statute, the state endorsed rehabilitation ideals in the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the prisons were operated by the state, the media was extremely influential
within such a small state, and the correctional officers were among the first officers to
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unionize.48 He argues that in this case, as well as in most judicial intervention cases,
the legal basis of intervention comes from the Eighth Amendment (which makes it
illegal to institute cruel and unusual punishments), in which a “totality of conditions”
warrants judicial intervention.49 Inherent in this is how this intervention affected the
nature of work of the correctional officers of Rhode Island. Carroll argues that judicial
intervention improved the physical conditions within archaic structures and helped to
remedy some of the most flagrant abuses within the system.50
All of these sources give a plethora of background surrounding post-war labor
history, the system of corrections, and the Rhode Island system of corrections in
particular. While some of these sources have been examined by historians before,
they have not been examined within this light. Overall, the post-war period of labor
history is presented by scholars as being one of potential and hope, which ultimately
led to a splintering of the movement in the latter half of the 1970’s. Public sector
workers are presented as having borne the brunt of the abuse as the conservative era
marched on. The study of the history of RIBCO intersects between all of these
subjects and intertwines to tell a history of an unstudied segment of workers in a
largely unexamined time period.
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CHAPTER 3

Origins
The 1960’s and early 1970’s were a time of turmoil for the entire nation.
Racial tensions were running high as race riots broke out across the nation. The
atmosphere became only more tumultuous with the death of civil rights leader Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr.. The American people were losing faith in their government to
handle problems both at home and abroad and were vociferously advocating against
the Vietnam War. American labor also became caught up in this wave of change and
activism. Workers across the nation united and protested their conditions, using a
variety of job actions and demonstrations to make their voices heard. They demanded
dignity, a democratic partnership with management, and sought to purge their stale
union leadership. Workers vented their frustrations and disappointment in a
government and economic system that led them to buy into the post-war dream of
prosperity for all. In actuality, the times were getting tougher and survival was more
difficult. It seemed as though the once optimistic and confident expectation for the
future was now a distant dream and the future seemed wrought with anxiety and
uncertainty.
This was a time period in which the correctional officers in the state of Rhode
Island realized that their needs for a labor organization were not being met. They
were affiliated with the Local 114 of the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which represented all kinds of public sector
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workers within the state of Rhode Island. While these representatives were talented,
they did not understand the specifics of the prison work environment. AFSCME was
not taking on cases that would benefit the correctional officers. In addition to this,
officers feared for their safety on a daily basis due to the chaos and lack of control
within the prison environment. The officers felt they needed to respond to the daily
chaos and turmoil that threatened the safety of its officers. The conditions within the
prison system were squalid and abuses within the system ran rampant. In an attempt
to bring attention to their concerns, officers engaged in wildcat actions, not sponsored
by AFSCME. These wildcat actions were indicative of the broader spirit of the labor
movement of the early 1970s, as the rebellious rank and file was often discontented
with their ineffective representation. Officers did not have any advocates or allies
within the system of corrections, and therefore united to advocate for themselves.
Officers engaged in wildcat action because immediate action was needed to ensure the
safety of all of the workers. However, these workers then took action in an
unconventional way. By December of 1970, officers decided that they were in need of
new representation by those who best understood the job, themselves.

The Providence Journal, in an article titled “Year of Strikes – Maybe More
Coming”, encapsulated the mood of the state of Rhode Island in beginning the new
year of 1970. It was clear that 1969 had been an extremely active year on the labor
scene for the state. In 1968, there had been twenty-five work stoppages; in 1969, the
number jumped drastically to forty work stoppages. It was anticipated that this level
of activity would be maintained in the new year as labor demands for higher pay and
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better benefits as well as dignity and democracy in the workplace has still not been
met. It was expected that the “areas of construction and public employment [would]
continue to be areas of high labor activity,” as workers negotiated contracts and
advocated and proposed legislation that would “increase the strength of employees in
collective bargaining” for those working in the public sector.51 It was anticipated that
the coming negotiations for the year of 1970 would affect five million workers
throughout the nation.52 The unemployment rate for Rhode Island was just slightly
above the national average, at 3.5 percent.53 Also, a previous strike in the construction
sector “raised the pay expectation of workers in other industries” throughout the state
followed directly by a strike by the Providence Teachers Union, who sought higher
pay and eventually a strengthened position for public sector workers in collective
bargaining.54 The 1966 Teachers Arbitration Act had worked against the union’s right
to strike and they were hoping to pass legislation to modify this act.55 If passed, this
legislation would affect the public sector as a whole.
While the entire state of Rhode Island was experiencing the same tensions the
rest of the nation was experiencing, the Adult Correctional Institution of Rhode Island
(ACI) was also defined by a state of bedlam and peril. The institution was constantly
plagued by inmate disturbances, rioting, fires, escapes, fights among inmates,
contraband, and attacks on officers. Lt. Ken Rivard, current grievance chair for the
RIBCO and previous RIBCO president, defines the situation as “very chaotic” and
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asserts that “the inmates ran the prison at the time”.56 He describes his first day as
“just like being at the mall, they [the inmates] [were] all around you”.57 There was no
sense of order or organization. Capt. Ronald Brodeur (a shift supervisor, 2nd Vice
president, and president of RIBCO for seven years in the 1980s) hired on October 14,
1973, also asserts that the prison was “very dangerous” and “out of control” and
maintains that “the prisoners ran the place”.58 Both men recall the very real sense of
danger that they encountered on a daily basis, as officers were taken away in
ambulances almost on a daily basis. In listening to their recollections, one wonders
which group was truly held prisoner: the inmates or the officers.
On December 10, 1969, twenty inmates began a disturbance that was typical of
the time. These twenty prisoners had been placed into the segregation unit for
previous offenses and, after making a trip to the new exercise yard (one day old) that
was built especially for those confined to segregation, they refused to go back to their
cells when asked. The inmates then “burned mattresses in their cells, threw food and
excrement outside and pelted the guards with objects”.59 The warden worked to set up
a disciplinary board so that the officers could lodge complaints against inmates. Yet,
as officers were being pelted with objects and were putting out fires and dodging
excrement, the inmate organization (the “JayCees”) was holding a Christmas party for
the inmates. Sadly, this event characterizes the state of the prison at this time and is
only one of many in a long list of disruptions.
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Fourteen of the men who were agitators in the disturbance and nine others
were, at the time, involved in a suit in federal court which asserted that they were
“‘discriminatorily’ singled out as ringleaders and forced to live in squalid conditions”
which constituted “cruel and unusual punishment”.60 While these conditions were
terrible, a great degree of the “squalid conditions” were created by the inmates
themselves. For example, these inmates were not served dinner, not as a punishment,
but because the administration was concerned for the safety of the officers. After two
inmates were served dinner, they threw the dinner right back out of their cells at the
officers.61
In an expansion of this original federal suit, a civil rights suit was brought to
the U.S. District Court by the prisoners to challenge the new prisoner classification
system.62 The purpose of the suit was to make sure that there were some safeguards of
due process with regard to notice for hearings and the ability to call witnesses or crossexamine witnesses for their hearings.63 A great degree of prisoner frustration and
officer frustration came from the fact that there were not any clear administrative
policies or directives. William Laurie, former assistant director for adult services in
the 1970’s (who held all of the responsibilities of a warden), affirms that the previous
administrations of the 1960’s had allowed the place to “go to hell”.64 In attempting to
follow the more liberal philosophies of the National Correctional Association and
federal government bureaucrats, the previous director of corrections for the ACI and
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the rest of the bureaucracy allowed the conditions to deteriorate and the administrators
“lost control” of the prison.65
In losing control of the prison, they also lost the public’s faith that their money
would be well-spent on this dilapidated prison system. At this time, there were no
adequate rehabilitative programs and any kind of programs that did exist were
ineffective due to their lack of support and funding.66 Funding that did come into the
prison came from federal grants that were sparse and were not guaranteed funding for
the prison to rely on.67 This created conditions which fostered rebellion and despair.
Members of the community, such as Julio Costa (a correctional officer who also acted
as an athletic coach at the ACI), made a plea within the Providence Journal Bulletin
for more funding to keep the inmates occupied with activities.68 As a person who was
intimately acquainted with the daily lives of the inmates, he spoke to the fact that
idleness causes disruptive behavior and that programs would help rehabilitative
efforts. He explained the need for more funding to keep any kind of recreation
activity going, as the little equipment that they had was wearing out.69 In addition to
this, the constant rioting and fire-setting left the facilities in a constant state of
disrepair. One fire on May 23, 1969, destroyed two-thirds of the maximum security
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building.70 Nine months later, the building still had not been restored to normal.71
The cost of the damage from this fire came to nearly $350,000.72
Sadly this lack of funding for supplies continued into later administrations.
William Laurie attempted to rectify this as Assistant Director of Adult Services. He
had a contact within the General Services Administration (GSA) in Washington which
deals with government surplus and could have provided the ACI with uniforms for the
inmates, trucks, and washing machines. The governor of the Rhode Island would not
sign the request, however, due to political reasons. The governor was a Democrat and
could not be seen accepting “goodies” from a federal government agency that was
under a Republican presidency.73
Another area that desperately needed funding was the officer training program.
Ken Rivard put it best in stating: ““I had no idea what I was getting into.”74 He was
hired by the warden, after an interview with the warden and was thrown right into the
fire without any kind of training whatsoever. There were no weapons or night sticks
and they were issued whistles to alert other officers to trouble. However, this was not
foolproof as this sometimes resulted in officers “run[ning] the other way”.75 A year
after this, they instituted a one week training session, and today, there is a ten week
pre-service training academy, at the union’s insistence.
This dilemma over federal funding continued well into the 1970’s and 1980’s,
as did the politics behind it, as we will see in later chapters. One of the major
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challenges that faced the officers was the fact that the public did not truly understand
the nature of their working conditions. The officers found that they needed to make
the public aware of their circumstances so that the public would realize that the
conditions were within their power to change, with funding. As circumstances
became more dire and dangerous, the public would eventually realize that something
had to change for the conditions within the prison to turnaround. 76
This has been the great dilemma that all public sector unions and workers have
had to face. They have been completely dependent upon the public for the funding
that shaped their working conditions. Workers have discovered that, while there were
still the same demands from the shop-floor “managers”, their “managers” or
administrators need to answer to a larger boss who ultimately has decided their
funding and their fate, the American public. The American public has always been
quite hesitant to spend money on anything it doesn’t have to and has always been
looking for ways to cut public spending. Administrators, caught in the middle, have
been unlikely to take a strong stance, for fear of angering the public who employed
them. An ugly pattern of finger-pointing usually results and accountability has then
been lost by the wayside. In this political game the only people left holding the bag
has been the workers themselves. In this case, the correctional officers were
consistently placed in dangerous predicaments and risked their lives each day. They
had no choice but to unite for their own safety.
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This was a time in Rhode Island’s history in which the mob was heavily
influential, both in the prison and political system. Lt. Rivard describes the situation
as: “Whatever the inmates wanted, they would get.”77 He recalls the steaks and
seafood brought in by outside vendors for the privileged few, and this was condoned
by the administration.78 Also, there was an incident in which the administration even
authorized a goat to come into maximum for an inmate.79 William Laurie, former
assistant director of adult services, recalls the special furloughs that had been granted
during the administration before his own. In one case, a particularly powerful mobster
(and convicted murder) had always been granted a furlough for Thanksgiving. Laurie
denied the request upon entering into the job. His describes his reasoning as such:
“Here’s two officers, who are working during Thanksgiving, taking a murderer (and a
nasty guy)…and [they are] standing in the other room while he had dinner with his
family…talk about demoralizing your staff.”80 Clearly, the prison was being run, not
by the state officials, but by the prisoners themselves.
In addition to mob control and influence, the NPRA (National Prisoner’s
Rights Association, founded in Rhode Island) had extensive control within the prison.
This continued up through when the state reclaimed the prison and placed key
members of the NPRA in the segregation unit.81 The NPRA pushed for legislation,
was involved in the media, and advocated for prisoner rights. Within the prison, they
controlled much of the politics behind the uprisings. Internal (comprised of prisoners
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themselves) and external boards (comprised of friends and relatives) of advocates
worked to ensure prison reform, but they also took advantage of the power vacuum
that existed and utilized this to gain access to special privileges and goods. They
sponsored events for all of the prisoners and also ran a restaurant on the premises.82
The Jaycees (an internal group affiliated with the larger United States Junior Chamber
organization which focuses on training and community service) were another strong
internal inmate group. This group also promoted events such as Family Day.83 This
created some security issues as the Family Day grew in size and scope, often bringing
hundreds of people into the prison.84 The second annual Family Day had 600 people
in attendance.85 As the leadership of the administrations grew weaker, the inmate
organizations stepped up to take advantage of the power void.
In May of 1969, a report drawn up by James Bennett, former director of the
U.S. Bureau of Prisons, outlined various changes that should be made to improve the
ACI. This was in response to a riot in January of 1969. As of February 1970, some of
the suggestions were implemented, and some problems had yet to be addressed. The
suggestions that were implemented consisted of raising the pay of the correctional
officers (to attract new personnel), obtaining federal funds, and the creation of a
comprehensive management survey (the goal of which was to create a chain of
command). Other suggestions that had not been implemented consisted of: decreasing
the overtime of officers, creating an “‘in-depth study’ of present duty posts of
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officers,” making changes to the maximum security building and to solitary
confinement cells, and appointing a board of civilians to help develop the industrial
workshops and education and training programs. Bennet argued that if all of the
officer’s positions were filled, the state would not need to spend so much on overtime
and could put that money to better use elsewhere. It was felt that “community
cooperation and involvement” was urgently needed to turn the situation around.86
Meanwhile, the prisoners were finding advocates in state legislators and U.S.
District Court Judge Raymond Pettine. State legislators, who had consulted with
inmate organizations, were pushing through legislation that would benefit lifers in
prison: those serving life sentences would be paroled after ten years instead of twenty;
donating a pint of blood would give the prisoners 10 days, instead of 5 days off of
their sentence; and lifers could participate in the work-release programs.87

At the

same time, Judge Pettine began to hear the complaints from prisoners regarding the
classification system and the state of the prisons. He found that prisoners were being
discriminated against, on the basis of race, as they were placed in the segregation unit
(the Behavioral Control Unit) frequently and were not given opportunities for workrelease or parole. Also, he found that conditions within the prisons were inadequate,
particularly regarding medical care and food. He prepared for further proceedings
regarding the conditions of life within the segregation unit of maximum security.88
These proceedings greatly affected the atmosphere of the prison and were the
catalyst for a great deal of the reforms within the prison. While ultimately the orders
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of Judge Pettine would help to bring in the necessary funding that the public refused to
approve, the rulings initially brought a great deal of frustration to the workers (namely
the correctional officers). Pettine began by creating a series of protocols which
reinforced “due process” within the disciplinary processes in the prison. However,
this created a lot of confusion and upset those who were attempting to carry these
policies out. At some points, enforcement was not consistent and procedure was
unclear to the workers. This appeared to further convolute the already confusing
system of procedure and also appeared to take away the authority of the officers
within the working environment. Officers, in a meeting with Pettine, exclaimed:
“we’re all on medication now and we’re running out of pills,” in an attempt to explain
how the system wasn’t working and demonstrate their fear that this would break it
further.89 One officer protested: “We find it impossible to run this place under these
foolish rules.”90 Judge Pettine asked the officers to view their role in a positive
manner, and explained that they were part of a “very challenging experiment” that
could “serve as a model for prisons throughout the country”.91 While this was an
admirable task, and Judge Pettine stated he understood the problems that his ruling
would create, he clearly did not anticipate the hostility and confusion that this ruling
would incite due to his lack of knowledge regarding the innermost workings of a
prison system.92 Officers’ authority was already minimal at best, and they viewed this
new interference and encroachment upon their already diminishing authority within a
hostile and dangerous working atmosphere.
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The year 1970 was a very active year as it not only kicked off the beginning of
the judiciary’s prison reform efforts in Rhode Island but also began the era of the
Howard administration at the ACI. Francis Howard, previously a Massachusetts
parole supervisor, took over the post from John Sharkey, who was interim after Harold
Langlois stepped down in June of the year before. Sharkey, while performing
admirably in light of the circumstances, had been both acting warden and assistant
director of the state Department of Social Welfare (for correctional services) at the
same time. Many looked to the Howard administration to bring much needed change
and to restore order and “calm” within the institution.93 Howard professed himself to
be of a reformist school of thought, and yet also expressed a desire to “firmly” deal
with the small faction of hardcore prisoners who were creating turmoil and
destruction.94 Correctional officers, themselves, had reason to be optimistic as
Howard had formerly been an officer and was also president of the Massachusetts
State Prison Employees Union for some time.95 However, this administration would
be characterized by its continuation of the same old ways.
Howard’s path of action was to create “a series of innovative programs to
make inmates’ life as close to that outside the walls as possible”.96 Initially this path
seemed promising as a very basic adult education program and job training courses
were instituted at the ACI weeks after Howard’s appointment.97 While programs were
indeed necessary to help change the conditions within the prison, funding for them
93

“Mass. Lawyer is New ACI Warden,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, March 13, 1970, 1.
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
David Donnelly, “New Warden to Seek Help of Ex-Inmates,” The Providence Evening Bulletin,
March 30, 1970, 1.
97
“State Offers Education to ACI Inmates,” The Providence Journal, June 5, 1970, 10.
“ACI to Offer New Job-Training Courses,” Providence Evening Bulletin, June 12, 1970, 28.
94

30

would prove to be problematic. He also sought the advice of ex-imates who were
familiar with the system. However, he did not seem to find it necessary to spend as
much time in consulting with the officers on the state of the prison.98 This
administration would fail to open up lines of communication with those who were
doing the work to maintain the security of the facility and undertook the risks that the
facilities presented on a daily basis. However, Howard did argue for an increase in the
pay scale of the correctional officers. He believed that this would improve the quality
of the workers that the prison was hiring. Also, he emphasized the role of the
correctional officer as a “front-line social worker” and stressed the job required more
than just the skills of a guard, it required skills in communication and behavior
management.99,100
While advocates for the prisoners were called to action on the political scene
and the press hailed Warden Howard as the catalyst for change, it was clear that
nobody was advocating for or supporting the officers. The representation they had
was inadequate. While it was clear that there were many issues that the prison had,
that needed to be addressed for the sake of everyone involved, there were many
methods for solving the dilemma. Unfortunately, in the meantime, the officers had
become “demoralized” and desperately needed support from the administration that
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they were not receiving.101 The AFL-CIO (under which AFSCME was organized)
dealt with a variety of issues in the state of Rhode Island at this time. First and
foremost, they were in opposition to a bill that would allow 15-year-olds to work
instead of attending school. They believed that this would decrease the amount of jobs
available to the adult population in a more difficult job market.102 They also were also
working on gaining an increase in the pensions for all state employees.103 While this
was beneficial to all workers, correctional officers included, there were a variety of
other issues that the officers needed to be addressed that the union would not have the
time or resources to delve into, due to the sheer amount of people it represented. The
frustrations of the officers were mounting as tensions within the prison escalated and
were left unresolved, and these frustrations would manifest themselves at the end of
the year, as they demanded representation that would support them and provide a more
effective path of action to improve their conditions.
On August 17, 1970, about forty guards stormed the office of Warden Howard.
They were clearly aghast at the lack of support that they were receiving from the
administration and had “reached the breaking point” of their frustrations.104 They
demanded that “certain changes would have to be made within a week” or they would
“start applying pressure”.105 Union officials, of the AFL-CIO, assured the warden that
this was not a union matter.106 Officer Louis Gallucci, spokesperson for the officers,
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explained to a reporter that action needed to be taken and that the press should expect
some “fireworks” on the following Monday, if nothing changed.107
In a meeting on August 19th, officers requested some very specific changes.
The first was to put into place “modified procedures to control the inmates”, including
screen doors on workshop doorways and more officers present during the inmate
meals in the dining facility.108 Secondly, officers requested more training and
uniforms for newer officers in a timelier manner.109 Thirdly, they expressed
frustration over the rulings of Judge Pettine, due to the fact that it made the officer’s
job “a lot more complicated”.110 Many felt that these procedures got in the way of the
enforcement of order, as this greatly increased the amount of bureaucracy and
paperwork needed for every action on the part of the officers. Lastly, the officers
asked that the vacated job positions be filled to bring their ranks up to “full
strength”.111 The union officials of the Local 114 American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees made an extra effort to insist that they did not back
the officer’s actions or complaints in these matters.112 The officers withdrew their
threat of wildcat action based on the apparent willingness of the administration to take
action.113 Money and manpower were proving to be problematic, yet the officers were
content with opened pathways of communication and professional discourse.
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As a result, the warden pledged to hire thirty more guards.114 This would
allow more people to be trained (as this required substitutes to stand in their place) and
would also help in terms of security during the meals in the dining areas, where
inmates were gathered in mass. Many officers were working 18 hour shifts.115 In a
ten week period, overtime payments totaled up to $84,451.116 The warden recognized
and publically acknowledged the psychological toll that this great amount of overtime
was taking on the officers, in the form of “impaired judgment” and “low morale”.117
Howard also acknowledged the on-going battle between the philosophies of prison
management and felt that, at the end of August 1970, the ACI’s moment of truth had
come. He explained the need for money if they were going to run a more
rehabilitative facility.118 The warden and the Providence Journal writers suggested
that the pay scales of the officers needed to be raised, to decrease the need for
overtime among the officers and to attract more candidates to the dangerous job.119
Of course, as to be expected in state politics, Republican party members
charged the governor’s office (a Democratic administration) with failing to provide
adequate resources to the ACI.120 A Republican task force was created to investigate
the conditions at the prison. This pattern would be repeated time and again. They
pointed to the clear need for more officers and they also pointed to the large amount of
money being spent in overtime pay. This issue over overtime pay would be a hotbed
issue, particularly in the 1980s, however it has its roots at the beginning of the 1970’s.
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While this political bickering often times intruded on actual progress being made, it
served at this juncture to suit the needs of the officers quite well. Warden Howard
responded negatively to these charges and recognized the need to keep the ACI out of
“partisan politics” in asserting that it would hinder the growth and development of the
institution.121
As of November 1970, the budget of the ACI increased from $2.4 million to
$3.6 million.122 Warden Howard pointed to the harsh working conditions for
correctional officers as a dire situation that required immediate relief. He pointed out
that officers were regularly working seven days a week and often more than eight
hours a day.123 He stated:
“[Correction officers] cannot carry the extreme pressures of this type of
sustained overtime work without paying heavy physical and psychological
penalties. Such penalties are already being paid and deterioration eventually
will show.”124
He reiterated the correlation between money and change. Without increased funds,
the institution would revert back to “a repressive Alcatraz-type situation”.125 He also
explained that compliance with the judicial orders of Judge Pettine required additional
staff and manpower.126
However, despite these promising developments (regarding the increased
budget and advocacy for the officers on the part of the administration), the officers
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still were left with the problem of representation. Similar to many workers of the
1970’s, they were very dissatisfied with their labor organization. AFSCME had
become too large to properly meet their needs or address their concerns. In a prison
environment, the needs of the officers can be a matter of safety and often a matter of
life or death. Volatile and extreme situations required immediate attention and action.
If a job action was necessary, the officers could not waste precious time waiting for
their union to address the matter through the proper bureaucratic channels.
Many workers of the 1970’s were echoing the same sentiments: they were all
the “forgotten man”.127 Overall, the labor movement created a kind of “national
consciousness through strikes, popular culture, voting booths, and corporate
strategy.”128 The goals of the labor movement included creating more humane
conditions and being treated with dignity.129 Yet, administrators and management did
not count the voice of the workers into the decision-making process. Those who
performed the jobs on a daily basis were not counted as experts, and were largely left
frustrated and overlooked. Historian Jefferson Cowie describes the labor scene best in
stating:
“They [the workers] fought with supervisors on the line, clogged up the system
with grievances, demanded changes in the quality of work life, walked out in
wildcat strikes, and organized to overthrow stale bureaucratic union
leadership.”130
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This is not only an accurate description of the actions of workers throughout the
beginning of the 1970’s, but also an exact description of the workers that would soon
form the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers during the same time.
However, this group of workers was not an average group of workers. These officers
were not just struggling for improved working conditions, but also were fighting for
their own safety and survival among hardened criminals. They had a startling degree
of unity and cohesiveness that was impressive even for that time period in labor
history. They were more invested, than the average worker, in ensuring that their
actions were successful.
During this same time, within the political realm, standing up to public sector
unions “became the litmus test of a politician’s sense of fiscal responsibility”.131 The
public questioned spending and, at least within the public sector, it no longer became
feasible to replace striking workers. The distance between union members and the rest
of the American public grew and both groups lost touch with one another.132
An editorial in the Providence Journal, written by a Rhode Islander, summed
up the mood of the times in the following manner:
“Is the Nixon administration testing the patience of the taxpayers in this
country, wondering how much longer they will keep their mouths closed,
before rising up in arms? It is bad enough that people are out of work. They
are lucky to get home safely…”133
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Workers and Americans were faced with a bleak picture that they desperately hoped to
change. This was a time of tension and struggle, but also a time of potential.
This decade is viewed by some labor historians as “a bridge between eras”.134
For most unions, while the first half of the era (within the early 1970’s) suggested a
great amount of progress and promise for workers, the second half (the latter part of
the 1970’s into the 1980’s) was disappointing in its regression and recognition of
limits. By independently organizing, the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional
Officers were able to overcome the struggles that most unions encountered throughout
the 1970’s and into the conservative years of the 1980’s. They were able to take more
immediate action and were also able to control a message to send to the general
public, which would help to gain them increased funds and support for various issues.
This union survived while other unions crumbled and created a public sector labor
union that would withstand politics, financial burdens, and challenges for years to
come. However, they were unaware that what they were creating was unique and
would be so successful, at the time that they were creating it. They were merely fed
up with the lack of support and the conditions they encountered every day, and
resolved to unite and fix their problems, one day at a time.
On December 17, 1970, 116 correctional officers in the state of Rhode Island
took a stand, along with many other workers of the same era.135 They resigned from
the Local 114 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
to gain “the recognition and bargaining power” they felt that they lacked.136 They
admonished the “quality of representation” that they had previously received and
134

Cowie, "Portrait of the Working Class,” 93.
“ACI Guards Eye New Labor Union,” The Providence Journal Bulletin, December 18, 1970, 29.
136
Ibid.
135

38

decided to chart a new path forwards.137 184 out of 240 employees previously
petitioned the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board for a new election (in
October 1970).138 The officers who resigned believed that, in forming their own
union, they would eventually push the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board to
hold an election, and they were correct, as they received an election in 1971.
John Galligan, who would be the first president of RIBCO, stated: “Most of
the correctional officers feel that by binding together, the state will be forced to
recognize them.”139 He also stated that he expected the workers to “press ahead” with
their new union, “regardless of how the board ruled.”140 It is clear that workers felt a
sense of commitment and unshakable resolve, which would be helpful to them in the
coming decades.
This period which led to the creation of RIBCO charted the path of a group of
workers who decided to go against the grain and take matters into their own hands.
By choosing to represent themselves, these workers were accepting responsibility for
their working conditions and took an active role in fomenting change. This set the
stage for a unique method of approaching unionism, which would be very successful
in later years. The tenacity, innovativeness, and solidarity exhibited by these workers
in the early years, carried forth for the next decade to come.

137

Ibid.
Ibid.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.
138

39

CHAPTER 4

The Formative Era
The 1970’s was an era in which society moved in a new direction.141 It was a
time when the New Deal era began to fall apart.142 The nation began to lose its sense
of direction and purpose. Jefferson Cowie characterizes the decade as a “troika of
disasters” in referring to the president’s resignation, the loss of faith in the national
government, and the fall of Saigon, as well as the economic disasters that resulted
from inflation, oil shocks, and deindustrialization.143 America entered an age of
“stagflation”. Wages, productivity, and output all dropped “sharply” and recessions
were frequent and more debilitating as time went on.144 Economically, the common
worker struggled while corporate executives earned twenty times the amount a
common worker would earn. Skills that were crucial to the ever expanding American
military war machine were not easily transferable to the consumer market, leaving
many without marketable skills in the job market. Economic hardship and social
inequality characterized this decade, and for many, this was not a time in their lives
that they would like to revisit. The general mood of the nation became pessimistic.145
Within the workplace, the expanding discussion of civil rights created many
legal difficulties for companies. Inflammatory issues throughout the 1970’s included:
workplace safety, health, the equitable treatment of women, and the equitable
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treatment of African Americas.146 The AFL-CIO found itself conflicting with Civil
Rights legislation in that they traditionally restricted access to craft unions to maintain
bargaining power and this, in reality, discriminated against minorities (with regard to
race and gender). While labor endorsed these laws and fundamentally agreed with the
principles contained therein, Title VII helped to destroy their solidarity as a bargaining
unit. The economic shocks of 1970’s were crucial in that they prevented the federal
government from being in an economic position to be able to interfere on behalf of
labor.147 Overall, workers had to learn to fight their own struggles because the cavalry
was not coming to advocate on their behalf, as they had been known to do in the past.
Clearly, the tides were turning and the situation became more extreme.
Throughout this formative era, RIBCO fought to protect the safety of its
workers, bargain for better wages and benefits, and gain respect within the realm of
public discourse. RIBCO engaged in a series of effective job actions and also utilized
the press to communicate to the general public. By the end of the decade, the union
managed to improve relations with management, increase wages, and build a public
image that would be crucial in years to follow.
1971: The Start of a New Era
Thus, as the new year of 1971 began, it is not surprising that the newly formed
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers began with a series of job actions
to demand the changes it required. Throughout the year, the union focused on trying
to re-establish the authority of the officers, increase their pay scale, and obtain greater
involvement in managerial decisions. They pushed for a uniform policy and set of
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enforceable directives from the administration to eliminate confusion. The officers
were successful in gaining some recognition on the part of management and also
gained more authority within the public sphere and established a presence within the
public forum (either in the legislature or within the press).
The union undertook a variety of actions to establish themselves as an effective
labor organization and also to increase their public exposure. First and foremost,
union leaders continuously argued in the public forum for an increase in the number of
officers on staff to increase security. This would greatly improve their working
conditions. The union argued for a training program would help new officers adjust to
the working conditions within the prison and would help the ACI retain employees.
Pension reform would also help to attract higher caliber workers. Officers also argued
for more shop-floor control both in the public forum (including in the newspapers as
well as before the legislature) and in interactions with the administration. They felt
that management did not take into account the practical aspects of implementing their
own policies and directives and felt that the officers should have greater voice in the
creation of a standard policy.
Internally, RIBCO struggled with all of the same problems all new unions face.
The union needed to win the hearts and minds of its members by demonstrating that
union organization did work. As with many unions of the 1970s, the union leadership
had to contend with its rebellious rank and file. A small faction of officers initially did
not agree with the majority and pushed for more extreme action. Union leaders were
hesitant to act too aggressively, for fear of damaging relations with the administration
permanently. The union also had to win the support of the public (or at least some
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degree of legitimacy) as it was a public sector union, at the mercy of the general
population. With the revolt at the Attica Correctional Facility in September and a
disturbance within the ACI itself in October, the union did manage to elicit some
sympathy and gain some public support.
On January 18, 1971, the morning shift at the maximum security facility
refused to report to work until they had been “promised tighter controls over
inmates”.148 This marked a stark contrast with the previous interactions between
officer leaders and the administration. This was a united job action, in support of
officer safety and stricter administrative regulations. They were responding to a
situation that occurred the night before during a Jaycee Chapter dinner. A guard had
been assaulted during the dinner when he stopped a visitor from bringing a bottle of
liquor into the facility.149 They were fearful because the prisoners had progressed from
name calling to assaulting the officers and the officers. The officers were granted a
search in the maximum security section for contraband in response to the change in
the atmosphere.150
The officers now had a much quicker, and more effective response to changes
in their work environment that they were opposed to. Until the administration handled
the situation, they would find themselves in a very difficult and dangerous
predicament. This was a tactic that was certain to bring immediate attention and
remedy to their concerns. The most immediate change was that four inmates were

148

“Prison Guards Refuse to Work, Receive Pledge,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, January 18,
1971, 1.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.

43

transferred to the Cedar Junction prison, located in Walpole, Massachusetts.151 Upon
performing the search of maximum security, the officers obtained several knives and
“other weapons” that were “smuggled in or stolen”.152 In addition to this, the warden
agreed to a new plan for the dining hall system, keeping more men on duty at one time
within the dining hall.153 Also, the man who was attempting to bring liquor into the
prison was charged.154 They also discovered, upon further investigation, that the
inmates had managed to smuggle in additional wine and whiskey. Directly after this,
Warden Howard banned parties of inmate organizations.155 It was clear that the
officers had picked a poignant disturbance to make their case and they had received a
quick and constructive response to their concerns.
Directly after this, inmates proposed four bills to the Senate in a legislative
forum sponsored by the ACI Jaycees and the prison newspaper, “The Challenge”. The
bills would allow those serving life sentences to attend work or school outside of the
prison, would stop the use of solitary confinement, would establish a board to help
represent African American inmates at the administrative level, and would grant
furloughs to prisoners deemed “trustworthy”.156 While racial representation was the
most admirable aspect of these proposed laws, there were some glaring difficulties it
would present regarding the security issues involved with allowing “lifers” to
participate in activities outside of the grounds. It would require an increase in
manpower and observation, and the precedent of work release was one that did not
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support the inmates’ cause. In 1970 alone, there were 30 escapes.157 A good
percentage of the escapes from the prison, in 1970 and previous years were due to
inmates who impulsively escaped on work release.158 Also, abolishing solitary
confinement would be abolishing a mechanism of discipline that the prison sorely
needed.159 Again, there was a direct conflict between the goals of security and
rehabilitation, and the officers would be expected to pick up the slack, if the
legislation passed. This also helps to demonstrate the great degree of power that the
inmates had within the political system and among the powers that be.
Legislation was then brought before the House of Representatives regarding a
few major points: a setting of minimum standards for food, clothing, exercise, and
hygiene, medical checkups, and the abolishment of the “hole” (a bare cell used for
punitive confinement).160 A couple of months later, the Senate passed a furlough bill
allowing unescorted furloughs under certain circumstances and also for interviews,
training, education, or health care not available at the ACI.161 These bills were meant
to remedy the problems regarding rehabilitation, yet they merely staunched the flow of
the actual problem. The prison still needed a substantial increase in funds to make the
rehabilitation goals a reality. Only with a substantial increase in funds would the
system be safe and also support rehabilitation. Unfortunately, it would take a series of
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escapes and violence over the next decade to make the legislative body of the state of
Rhode Island and the public realize that only an increase in funding and serious
improvements to the facilities would bring the much needed change to this prison
system.
On the labor front, the ACI guards were fighting a difficult battle. While
legislation was being passed in favor of the prisoners needs, the legislation regarding
pensions did not favor the officers. On July 6, 1971, sixty officers on the morning
shift refused to report to duty.162 They were frustrated with the Senate’s “failure to
act” on an improved pension plan.163 The officers decided to “follow our president”
[sic.] and ended the work stoppage, but they clearly made their displeasure known.
The bill would have allowed retirement at age 50 with twenty years of service, and at
that time the retirement age was 58 with thirty five years of service.164 Newly elected
President of RIBCO, John Galligan, poignantly stated, in support of the bill:
“People don’t realize that it’s as hard for the guards as it is for the inmates.
The inmates get a life sentence and they’re up for parole after 10 years. We
get a life sentence and it’s good for 35 years.”165
Typically, in most other states (in the past and presently), a system of earlier
retirement for corrections personnel was instituted due to the nature of the work. The
guards clearly believed that they had fallen on the wrong side of the political game
regarding workers and prisoners, and were not going to let it continue.
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This was a test of cohesiveness for the Brotherhood. In returning back to
work, many felt that their executive board had not taken a hard enough stance. The
new organization was barely six months old and was withstanding its first test against
internal factions. John Galligan, the president, opted to take a course of action that
was less extreme and would not endanger the “security of the prison or the health and
safety of the community,” because a prolonged absence of the officers could mean an
increased chance of rioting.166 Many officers felt that they could not take the
legislators at their word and needed to take a more aggressive stance. This faction
ripped up their membership cards in a display of anger.167 Galligan referred to the
union as “a disgruntled organization”.168 However, as a whole the organization stayed
together and presented a case to the legislators. They produced a list of thirty two men
who were suffering from “heart attacks, hypertension, high blood pressure”, ailments
brought on or worsened by stress, in an attempt to explain why a lower retirement age
was necessary in this line of work. They also listed guards who had been beaten,
stabbed, and one who “had scalding water thrown in his face”.169 Even if they did not
all agree on the path of action, for the most part, they all recognized that unity would
be their best chance of making a change. It did work in this case, as they got the
legislation passed. However, more importantly, they survived this internal crisis and
united for future endeavors.
At the same time, the officers now found that they had a stronger voice in the
public arena, and a larger audience with regard to reporters. In a close up profile of
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Warden Howard, in which he tried to inform the public of his position on matters of
importance and just how much of a struggle he was encountering in making changes,
there was also a good degree of officers’ opinions contained within the article.170
Warden Howard appeared to put a good majority of the responsibility for
rehabilitation on the officers in stating: “I think that when rehabilitation is done
properly, it will be done by the correctional officers…” “… We have some officers
doing this right now…” “…It’s too bad there aren’t more.”171 Ronald Brodeur, who
was an officer at that time, explained the frustration of the officers in response to
attitudes like this in stating: “How can you hold us accountable when you are not
going to tell us what it is we need to be accountable for?”172 One officer, when asked
how the rest of the officers felt about the warden, explained that he thought they
believed that the warden was not exercising enough control over the inmates.173
Howard was focused on instituting a training program for the officers that would
“include instruction in basic corrections, practices as well as the philosophies behind
modern penology”.174 While this sounds admirable, the push for a training program
came from the officers themselves, not any state officials.175 The officers were in
need of some kind of consistent policy that would be enforced by all, as to avoid
confrontation with inmates and administrators.176 This is indicative of the path that
corrections officials would embark on for the next few years: a path in which the
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administration and the workers would confront one another in the public forum (the
newspapers) to gain the support of the public.
However, the public, unfortunately, would not be moved to action without
incentive. Usually this incentive was in the form of safety, and action was taken in
response to a perceived threat. The first, in a series of perceived threats to the people
of Rhode Island (and the American public in general), came in the form of the
rebellion at Attica Prison, New York. Thirty-seven men (twenty eight prisoners and
nine hostages) were killed in this bloody confrontation.177 One thousand state
troopers, sheriff deputies, and correctional officers stormed the prison and retook it
after a tense five day standoff, involving the taking of hostages (officers and civilian
workers) and capturing of cellblocks.178 An article within the Providence Journal
contains pictures of the storming of the facility and the disaster contained within. 179
There is also a particularly moving picture of a surviving hostage who was embracing
his wife after his release. He was saved by an inmate who only pretended to cut his
throat.180 These images served to make the confrontation less abstract in the minds of
the citizens of Rhode Island. With all of the turmoil at the ACI, it seemed that an
insurrection was inevitable and would affect the lives of human beings with families
and loved ones.
This would make the situation even more difficult for Warden Howard, who
was pushing for the public to spend money on rehabilitation. The warden tried to tie
this incident to the need for rehabilitation. He further alarmed the Rhode Island
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citizens by informing them that this unrest was of a national nature and that he thought
it was a “national type of movement, this revolutionary group, agitating group.”181
Again, this opened up the discussion involving prison conditions, with regard to the
demands of the inmates within the Attica prison facility.182 However, a critical shift
occurred in the public discourse: the danger that the officers faced every day was now
put front and center in the public discourse. Workers, who were victims of prison
violence now had names and faces to put to the names. Officers were now viewed as
human beings, with lives and with families and loved ones.183 More frequently,
comparisons between the Attica State Prison and the ACI were drawn, helping to
further intensify the anxieties of the public.184 As unrest spread to the Cedar Junction
prison facility in Walpole, and Warden Howard stated that he anticipated unrest at the
ACI, the citizenry of Rhode Island became extremely alarmed.185 While this massacre
was a tragedy for everyone involved, it served to quantify the danger for the average
citizen who had never been within prison walls and had no conception of the degree of
peril and fear these officers encountered on a daily basis. Furthermore, the public
would be more willing to provide resources to support the officers, so that the violence
and danger would not spill out into the surrounding communities. It was clear that, if
things did not change, the blood of these victims, these correctional officers, would be
on the public’s hands.
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Providence Journal writer Paul Giacobbe summed up the paradoxes of the
early 1970’s nicely. He referred to it as
“an age when the violence of Atticas and Soledads clash with quieter calls for
prison reform, and an angry society’s reaction to crime in the streets is
challenged by a demand for increased civil rights; running a prison is an
unenviable job combining the problems and headaches of a police chief and a
college president.”186
The larger question was going to be how to compromise between reform and safety, in
addition to how to fund the changes. John Sharkey, head of correctional services, was
prophetic in viewing Attica as a catalyst for the major changes to come.187 He
proposed the destruction of maximum security, and the building of a few new, smaller
buildings in its place.188 A frustrated Warden Howard appealed to the state budget
panel and to the people of Rhode Island in asking: “Do the people of Rhode Island
want an ‘Alcatraz-type’ facility or efforts to rehabilitate?”189 An editorial in the
Providence Journal made certain to reiterate the crucial point made by Warden
Howard that “the state correctional institutions don’t belong to a state bureaucracy but
to the people of Rhode Island.”190 It went on to say: “The public cannot wash its
hands of what goes on behind prison walls.”191 The fate of the correctional officers
hinged upon the mercy of the public.
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The war of words in the Providence Journal continued: on one side the
administration and the inmates, and on the other, the officers. One article, titled
“‘Experts Tell of Life Inside ACI: Prison Found Not Correctional,” gave a series of
interviews with inmates who described the conditions and also insinuated some abuse
by the officers.192 Inmates who had been to other facilities referred to the ACI as a
“summer camp” while others disagreed.193 In direct response to the piece regarding
Warden Howard and the piece on the inmates, the officers put forward a response in
an article detailing the nature of their work and responsibilities, as well as their daily
stress.194 President Galligan explained that recruitment and retention were their
largest problems.195 Another officer exclaimed, with frustration: “Because of Pettine
and Howard, we can’t do our job.”196 Again, the shortage of personnel was stated as a
major cause of frustration, because this meant many officers were working seven days
a week. Also, many were refusing promotions, in an attempt to retain seniority
privileges which were not protected upon promotion.197 The Brotherhood reiterated
that they would be sponsoring a bill that would establish a training program for new
officers. John Galligan also demonstrated to a reporter, in the visiting room that
contraband and drugs could easily be slipped to prisoners in the visiting room due to
the lack of personnel hired to be on watch in the room (at that time, only one officer
was posted in the visiting room).198 Pictures of individual officers on the job, helped
to humanize their position. The reporter made an effort to explain how they were
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“struck by the vulnerability of the officers” in that “hundreds of inmates wander freely
inside and outside the blocks, workshops, and yard, surrounding single, unarmed
officers”.199 This paints a very different image from that put forth by the inmates, and
helps to gain the officers sympathy in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately the
mysterious aura of the prisons had been working against the officers who were doing a
bulk of the work. With more press exposure and visitors to the prison, the officers
were able to make their conditions accessible to the general public and give their
grievances greater credibility and legitimacy.
A disturbance involving thirty inmates who were refusing to go back to their
cells held up operations in the ACI on October 30, 1971.200 This seemed to confirm
the worst fears of the citizens of Rhode Island. Officers, as was now their pattern,
refused to report to work for two hours until they had a meeting with a warden to
discuss what would be done in response to the disturbance. In response, inmates were
held in their cells all day the next day and remained under lockup the day after.201
Officers also requested that a printed set of “guidelines governing conduct of both
prisoners and guards” be drawn up, as to create some consistency in enforcement.202
The union felt that officers should be more involved in this process of drawing up a
guideline for conduct. Officers were also upset by the fact that they were told by the
warden that there was no money to hire additional officers.203 The officers also argued
for the creation of a list of prisoner infractions, which would help deter them from
rebellious behavior and would also assist in the prisoner classification process. The
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administration disagreed with this policy, and viewed it as a throwback to the archaic
policies of earlier decades.204 The officers were constantly appealed to as the group to
make the reforms a reality, and yet were struggling to take responsibility within the
prison. The administration was not allowing them to take responsibility, and yet often
berated them in the press for not doing so. They were stuck within a losing situation
and would struggle for some time to find a balance.
The administration did make some efforts to avoid new disturbances. On
November 19, 1971, eleven inmates were transferred out to other institutions in a bold
move on the part of the administration.205 This was in response to a plot to take
guards hostage, similar to the situation in Attica.206 The inmates had been hiding
weapons and also stockpiling food, enough for a few weeks. They were also
attempting to take top prison officials hostage as well.207 Surprisingly, all officials
deferred to the warden and his statements and refused to comment further until the
governor confirmed the plot.208 While the press blasted Warden Howard for his policy
of secrecy, this is the kind of leadership that would unite the prison and create a
positive working atmosphere for all involved, instead of constant bickering in the
public realm.209
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While major events were taking place regarding policy and safety, the union
also had to band together on other labor issues at the end of 1971. Officers began to
band together to challenge suspensions. They threatened job action over the
suspension of John Kiley, who was suspended for taking too much sick leave.210
Unfortunately, Mr. Kiley was suffering from acute diabetes and was given a
physician’s certificate which stated that he was unable to work due to illness.211 While
this is a smaller incident, it is crucial in demonstrating that, within a year, the
Brotherhood was now bringing issues to the table that were sure to be ignored by a
larger bargaining unit. Safety and policy were issues that benefited from an
independently organized union, but other issues regarding employment and benefits
could also be given the individual attention that they deserved.212 Overall, the year of
1971 served to bring unity through job action and strength under the strong leadership
of John Galligan. The union survived its first tests of cohesiveness. As the union
entered 1972, its members continued to adhere to the growing inclination towards
“union militancy.”213
1972: Responses to Attica
The year of 1972 began with more measured goals which were all achieved
throughout the year. The union advocated for five laws that would benefit the
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officers, and lobbied the legislature effectively to pass this legislation. Union leaders
pushed for increased pre-service training as well as professional development
incentives for those who were already employed by the ACI. They also sought to
improve the contract by increasing their pay and gaining more benefits, at a level
equitable with their counterparts in other states. Lastly, officer safety was always a
priority, however the union did not need to argue as publicly for increased safety
measures as the general public vociferously clamored for change in response to
escapes and a hostage situation.
Many reformist-minded professionals, administrators, and legislators proposed
multiple directions for change within the ACI, at the beginning of 1972.214 Three bills
were pending in the General Assembly: one would allow prisoners who were serving
life sentences to participate in a work-release program, one would create a three
member African-American advisory committee, and one would allow unescorted
furloughs.215 However, a very small article acknowledged the testimony given to a
personnel subcommittee of the Governor’s Citizens’ Action Council for the Adult
Correctional Institutions by RIBCO president John Galligan. In this testimony,
Galligan again stressed the overtime work that was actually needed to maintain an
“equitable salary”.216 He argued that officers were overworked and the quality of their
work suffered as a result. Even more interesting was a meeting that was arranged by
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the union to lobby for five other bills that would benefit the correctional officers.217 In
meeting with the state legislators, the officers were also asked their opinion on the
other pending legislation regarding the reform bills. The officers gently expressed
their displeasure with the work release plan for those serving life sentences, based on
security factors.218 The five bills that were proposed for the benefit of the correctional
officers involved: increasing the amount of retirement allowance, the inclusion of
superiors officers and counselors in the retirement plan, providing incentive pay for
those who continue their education in correctional work, providing pay for time lost
due to an assault, and making it a crime to incite a riot or encourage violence that
would lead to a riot.219 The work release bill was delayed so that a hearing could be
held to weigh the pros and cons regarding the proposed legislation, subsequent to the
discussion with the union.220 It was then returned to committee.221 John Galligan was
also asked his opinion on the furloughs bill, in which he stated that the officers felt it
should be restricted to minimum security inmates only.222 As a direct result of Attica,
officers now had some sympathy among the legislators.
Officers were now also given a voice in hearings, such as the seminar
conducted by an educational consulting firm under the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration.223 Workers now had a venue to voice their complaints and concerns
regarding their lack of training and lack of professional development. They also
gained an opportunity to discuss the inconsistencies that resulted from the lack of
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training and lack of a clear policy.224 Many explained that good workers left because
of the discrepancies between what was taught in school and the reality of the
conditions within the prison itself.225 After this, a report was generated and distributed
to prison officials and reviewed by a ten man board.226 This served to raise the morale
of the officers as workers, and also served to bring more attention to the hazards and
confusion of the shop-floor environment. It also served to bring about immediate
action. On June 12, the ACI began in-service training.227
Meanwhile, the administration proposed building a new prison complex,
fashioned after the ideas of John Sharkey (with a good number of smaller
buildings).228 They put forth halfway houses and probation as effective solutions to
the ACI’s growing list of problems.229 However, this was not enough. In the
beginning of July 1972, The Citizens’ Action Council on the Adult Correctional
Institutions received a harsh report condemning the ACI administration as being
“weak and indecisive”, which was destroying chances of rehabilitation.230 It
complained that the staff needed a central direction to follow so that they will know
“exactly what the policies and programs are.”231
With the mass criticism, the Department of Corrections opened its doors, under
the new leadership of Anthony Travisano. Travisano announced his agreement with
the philosophy of the report and stated: “We intend to develop a correctional
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philosophy which will take into account many of the positive recommendations.”232
The editors of the Providence Journal hailed Travisano as being the welcome breath
of fresh air that the tired old ACI prison system desperately needed; the one who
would fill the leadership void.233
In addition to the creation of the Department of Corrections, several new
reforms in the operations of the ACI were put forth in an attempt to resolve some of
the growing issues within the system. The most important policy changes and plans
were that women would be back into the prison system of Rhode Island (and would
reside in the Training School for Girls, where there was now room for them), the
cottages at the Boys Training School would be renovated, the transfer of minimum
security to the women’s reformatory building, the transfer of the Youth Correctional
Center, moving the awaiting trial inmates from maximum to the medium-minimum
security building, the establishment of a special program for first time offenders, the
expansion of an in-service training program, and citizen participation in programs.234
Meanwhile, fourteen officers began taking a college level course in corrections
brought to the ACI by Salve Regina College (now University).235 Francis Foley,
deputy warden of the medium-minimum security unit at the ACI, hailed this as the
beginning of a “new era” for correctional officers in Rhode Island.236 Foley explained
that more officers would take part in the program if they were offered the pay
incentives similar to police officers.237 These officers completed the course on August
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12, and the course was so successful that the course would be expanded.238 This
helped to increase professionalism within the workplace and also helped officers to be
equipped to handle all of the demands that a “correctional officer” must deal with, in
addition to security.
September of 1972 brought a manhunt for four escapees, three of which were
convicted killers.239 The inmates broke out through the chapel and slid down the
downspouts on the side of the building to get to get away cars that were awaiting
them.240 At the time, the general public could just drive right up to the building and
this was an instance of a great lapse in the security of the building.241 This sparked an
all-out manhunt to capture the prisoners and helped to foster fears within the
community of Cranston in particular. Sadly, officials had been warned of the escape
in advance by a select group of inmates and the state police had a stake-out outside the
prison.242 They were still unable to thwart the plot.
A majority of the problem regarding the escape was that the officers were not
warned that a plot was in the works.243 There was no system in place to brief a new
shift coming in to work, and the administration saw no need to warn the officers in any
case. John Galligan made an effort to correct earlier statements by prison personnel
that insinuated that they had been kept in the loop. The entire incident also served to
make a mockery of the entire system and bring further despair to those who were
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making an honest effort for change, and those who were working within the system.244
A report that was published by a special investigating committee blasted both the state
police officials and administrators within the ACI who were in charge, calling their
path of action “astonishingly lax and unprofessional”.245 ACI officers outside of the
prison on normal patrol, who were not notified of the plot, noticed some oddities but
failed to report them due to their lack of knowledge.246 The committee noted the lack
of portable communications equipment, metal detecting equipment, written reports
regarding unusual activity, secure parking, proper lighting, prison uniforms, regular
visits by the warden or the deputies within the maximum security section, and a
mandatory training program which would include training regarding “preparation of
reports, prisoner control, riot training, small arms proficiency, and self-defense.”247
The report also demonstrates that the administration put the life of one of the officers
at risk by not informing him of the situation at hand.248 This was not unusual.249 In
responding to this report, Deputy Warden Roland Remillard explained that he was
given ninety nine officer positions and yet he really needed one hundred and forty four
to maintain security.250 While the training program was instituted fully in the next
year, the rest of the recommendations regarding the physical conditions of the
facilities would take another decade to be followed, due to lack of funds.
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It was under this state of increased scrutiny and increasing frustration that
RIBCO entered into contract negotiations. This was extremely significant as the
officers “had no contract for several years” and came forth with a set of demands.251
In a demonstration of solidarity, one hundred workers reported to a meeting in protest
of the long delays in their contract negotiation process.252 Eugene Fagnant, grievance
chair at that time, explained that the union was looking for pay increases to make their
salaries equal to that of officers in Massachusetts and Connecticut.253 They were also
looking for “seniority provisions” and “other benefits”.254 Officers were being paid
$8,500 and were looking to increase their pay scale to $12,000.255 An increase in pay
and benefits would help to attract better workers.
On November 19, the night shift called out sick in response to a lack of a
contract.256 State troopers had to be called in to fill some of the positions.257 Civilian
employees in the shops also stayed out of work in a show of support. RIBCO attorney
Gerard Cobleigh met with Joeseph Murray (of the state personnel division) to iron out
details involving full pay for officers who had been attacked on the job, state payment
of funeral expenses, and paying double overtime on holiday Mondays (as consistent
with the “long weekend” law).258 The officers returned to work with the reopening of
salary negotiations by the governor.259 They received an agreement on their pay
increase on November 29, a mere week after entering into negotiations regarding the
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wage increases.260 After this, the sick out was viewed to be one of the strongest
weapons that RIBCO had within its arsenal. While they did not use it frequently, as to
not be charged with irresponsibility, it was used in a manner which was effective and
ended labor negotiations fairly quickly and favorably for the union.
Sickouts were typically used as tactics at the time because full-out strikes were
forbidden by state employees.261 An officer at the time, Ronald Brodeur (who would
become RIBCO president in the later part of the decade), explained that the
Brotherhood was needed to ensure equitable pay for their officers.262 Officer safety
and equitable wages were two points that the union always fought on and often would
engage in job action for. This was not one battle, but a “long, hard fight”, which was
just beginning in the early 1970’s.263 Ken Rivard, also an officer at the time, concurs
with this and states that: “We had to bond together.”264 They became very “vocal and
strong” out of necessity, they needed to fill the “void” in leadership that existed and
protect their fellow officers.265
The need for protection was clear, as the situation at the prison had only
become more tumultuous. On November 26, in the midst of contract negotiations,
Officer Robert Picard was taken hostage.266 John Galligan stated that this situation
demonstrated the need for more officers. 267 Cranston Mayor James Taft, responding
to this situation and the earlier breakout of four convicts, disturbed by the possible
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danger this brought to his town, stated: “I’m tired of the studies and no action.” “I
think we should act now before a tragedy occurs in the city of Cranston.”268As more
disruptions were predicted, it appeared that all of the public officials were concerned
about the turmoil spilling out into the surrounding communities.269 While this was a
valid concern to have, not one official appeared to be concerned for the safety and
well-being of the workers within the prison. Officers were held responsible for the
chaos as many used them as scapegoats, claiming that they were just not working hard
enough to regain control. While this event may have worked to support the officers in
their requests for a pay increase, the officers appeared to be viewed as a nuisance to
the general public. Other state unions began demanding pay increases proportional to
that of the officers and Governor Licht was put into the position of having to defend
his support for increasing the pay of the officers.270
The year did end on a high note for the officers with their new contract and
with the establishment of a required six-week training course.271 This course was
meant to “instruct the men in their dual roles as security guards and rehabilitative
officers”.272 This would serve to clear up some of the confusion that had been voice
by the officers with regard to policy directives. However, it would have been more
constructive to institute this course before a separate panel issued a very public report,
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condemning them for not already doing so. If they had listened to the officers
grievances initially, perhaps a good deal of disturbances and public embarrassment
could have been avoided. Overall, 1972 was instrumental in refining union tactics as
well as making some hard won gains. The officers now had a new and improved
contract, greater educational and training opportunities, legislation which made their
jobs and lives a little better, and also had begun to flex their muscle within the realm
of state politics. However, one thing of great concern to the officers still largely
remained: constant threats to their safety and well-being.
1973: A Year of Violence
Violence was the defining characteristic of 1973. Throughout the year, the
ACI experienced several disturbances. Officers instituted lockups, on their own
initiative (and without administrative support), in an attempt to maintain some
semblance of order. One disturbance turned into a full-scale riot, in April, which
damaged the infrastructure of the maximum security building and severely hampered
operations. Most importantly for the Brotherhood was the killing of Officer Donald
Price in June. This was a critical turning point for the officers as they realized the
severity of their situation and banded together to ensure that this could never happen
again.
The union worked throughout the year to gain allies within the administration
and to protect those superior officers who supported the interests of the officers.
Women also became crucial players (both as prisoners and workers), and began to
take a greater role in shaping the direction of the reform process. The union also made
great overtures to make the public aware of the precarious situation they were placed
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in during the reform process. As violence escalated, it became clearer that the reforms
that were instituted were not done so properly and the prison system was in constant
danger of descending into complete chaos.
The union had very few allies, particularly within the prison system itself.
Inmates typically sought the transfer or reassignment of superior officers who
attempted to instill order and supported the common officers. The inmates would
inevitably clash with the officers over staffing policies and one such case involved the
reassignment of superior officer Roland Remilliard. A brief sickout was staged by the
union in response to the reassignment.273 The union believed the administration was
engaging in “poor personnel practices” and believed that, in many cases promotion
had been based on “patronage” rather than merit.274 This shows that the union was
now beginning to take on the internal politics of the prison. This incident was
indicative of the growing struggle for control between officers and the inmates.
The power balance between the inmates and the officers also began to change
in the public sphere. In a blatant turning of the tide, prisoners held their annual
legislative forum and yet, only one senator attended.275 Perhaps this was due to the
officers making a case in the public forum, or due to the fact that the prisoners had dug
their own grave with the public in instigating disturbances and inciting violence.
Either way, this depicts a clear shift in the power structure from just a couple of years
previously. Inmate organizations were clearly losing their influence over legislators.
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Changes in political offices and the administration had many implications for
the ACI.

Warden Howard would officially resign on April 18th.276 This post would

be filled by James Mullen. The newly elected governor, Philip Noel, promised change
for the prison system of Rhode Island. He stated that he believed the warden had
moved too fast in instituting reforms and stated: “’I don’t think you can move into
some of these reforms unless you have the full confidence’ of the deputy wardens,
prison guards, and other prison administrators.”277 Governor Noel appeared to be
supportive of the correctional officers in discussing the philosophies of the warden.
He stated that he believes the officers and the warden had a “basic conflict” in that the
warden believes prisons are solely for rehabilitation where the officers understand it is
for rehabilitation and punishment.278 He also stated: “You have to select a pace of
change that makes sense, and you have to work with your corrections officers so that
they’ll understand and accept the kind of change you’re going to implement…”279
The governor clearly understood the fundamental gap between the administration and
its workers. He also brought attention to the fact that the administration had not been
working in sync with its workers, which led to confusion.
President Galligan fought vehemently throughout 1973 to make the public
aware of the precarious situation the officers found themselves in when balancing the
need for reform with safety. He argued that there was an “in-between” between
reform and security and pushed for what he termed as “the establishment of some

276

“Warden of ACI Resigns,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, April 18, 1973, 1.
“Noel Will Decide Changes at ACI,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, April 5, 1973, 1.
278
Ibid.
279
Ibid.
277

67

definite policies and procedures to be followed by the prison personnel.”280 Anthony
Travisano, director of the Department of Corrections, implied that the officers had
been a roadblock in the way of implementing reforms.281 President Galligan, in an
exasperated and angry response, explained to the Providence Journal reporters that a
major failing of Travisano’s administration had been “a lack of clearly defined
policies for the guards”.282 They felt the administrative officials consistently made
decisions with an apparent lack of regard for security considerations. One example
given was the decision to let numerous visitors into the prison at night, where they
were short-shifted. This “severely taxed” an already over-worked group of officers
and created some security concerns.283 Galligan further retorted that this was part of
their negotiations in the previous year and that they were still waiting for the
distribution of these procedural rules.284 He reiterated that the officers were not
against reform, yet needed to have some safeguards in that they needed more staff to
implement the programs safely.285 Retired Captain Ronald Brodeur, in recalling
situations like these, stated: “If it weren’t for the union, management would make
decisions that would definitely jeopardize the safety of the staff that work here”.286
Officers had to band together to keep from being consistently placed in compromising
situations.
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The ACI underwent a fairly extensive grand jury probe regarding the four
escapees of the previous year. In this probe, various suggestions were made for
security.287 Mr. Travisano acknowledged that a good deal of clerical work and
physical labor was being done by officers, when the tasks could be performed by
civilian workers.288 In adding staff that could alleviate the duties of the officers,
Travisano was hoping to cut down on the amount of money being spent on
overtime.289
Also, the women’s facility was growing and developing and gaining greater
attention in the local media. 290 This meant that there would be greater opportunities
for females looking to work in the field of corrections. At this time, only male officers
were allowed to work in male prisons. The facility, reestablished the previous year,
housed twenty one inmates. Deputy Warden Gloria McDonald attributed the growing
population of sentenced women to the fact that there was actually a facility within the
state to hold them, as previously judges did not want to send these women away from
their families. She also came out in favor of the new “trend” in reform policies and
explained that, in the women’s facility, they were able to try things with the prisoners
that they were not able to in a larger facility.291
Despite the growing discourse regarding security and new ideas for reform,
violence ran rampant as the struggle for control between the inmates and officers
intensified. On April 2, 1973, the ACI underwent a riot in which four guards were
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injured and many fires were set.292 In the earliest hours it was rumored that inmates
were holding hostages and battling “hand-to-hand” with officers and police.293
Officers characterized it is a full-scale riot and announced that the inmates had “taken
over the place”.294 All of the industrial shops were destroyed.295 Violence had been
escalating over a ten day period including five stabbings and a fight between two
groups of African American inmates.296 The surrounding community was upset by the
disturbance and Mayor Taft was extremely agitated with his lack of information,
particularly since his town’s emergency vehicles were responding to the situation.
Later reports explain that two hundred inmates were involved in the riot and it went on
for about three hours.297 Aides to the governor forecasted the damage would cost
millions of dollars.298 It was confirmed that officers were held hostage, yet were
luckily let go.299 It appeared to the officials that it was a spontaneous riot.300 A
segment in the Providence Journal, titled “Day the ACI ‘Exploded,’” featured a series
of pictures of the riot, the prisoners (all looking fierce and wild), a weary Warden
Howard, and the damage.301 Inmates blamed Roland Remilliard, deputy warden, for
the escalation of tension, as they were clearly unhappy with his attempts to regain
control of the facility.302 However, the level of violence that resulted shows just how
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extreme the situation was becoming and how united and firm the officers remained in
the wake of violence.
The women’s facility which was also enduring a good deal of turmoil,
experienced a separate disturbance of their own on April 6th. 303 Female inmates were
displeased when a woman, who refused to return to her cell, was brought back to her
cell by means of physical force. The other women refused to return to their cells at
first, but eventually complied with requests. The women believed that the programs at
the ACI were inferior when compared to other facilities (such as Framingham, where
they were all previously held).304 One of the causes of this particular incident was that
it was two male officers who brought the female to her cell. While the women’s
facility did employ some female officers, males worked there as well. This did not
work the other way around for years to come. This unrest would serve to increase the
similarities between female and male officers within the union.
The maximum security complex was severely damaged by fire during the
rioting and was already overcrowded.305 The administration and officers now faced
the problem regarding the destruction of the industrial buildings. While there were not
any rehabilitation programs to speak of, there were jobs that occupied many of the
inmates’ time. Now, with the destruction of the shops, inmates would be idle and
more likely to engage in more rebellion. Officers were also subjected to a good
degree of verbal abuse and were the targets for many who were throwing objects from
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their cells during the lockup that followed the riot.306 Yet the officers remained in
fairly good spirits despite the overtime work in cleaning up the prison and the
abuse.307 It appeared as though the public may finally take the issues that they were
facing seriously and provide them with the resources they needed.
However, the Rhode Island House Finance Committee apparently did not take
the monetary needs of the prison as seriously as other segments of Rhode Island were
beginning to. They voted to cut $100,000 from the funding available to hire more
officers for the squad who handled prisoners in transit.308 Attorney General Israel
stated that he felt there was a “‘deep-seated’ tendency ‘not to spend more on the
criminal justice system.’”309
In the midst of all of this, Captain James W. Mullen was appointed to be the
new warden.310 He promised the staff “strong support” but also demanded that
everyone recognize that he was in charge.311 He had a good deal of experience within
the Rhode Island state police force. He also stated that he was concerned with the
“performance of the correctional officers” and elaborated that they had been without
leadership for the previous three or four months.312 He explained that the channels of
communication were open with the Brotherhood.313 He also specified that he was first
concerned with security and discipline” and that “everything else follows that.”314
Editorialists, while looking upon the warden’s tough approach favorably, were
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concerned that he was working too hard to appease the public, and was not properly
emphasizing the need for funding for change.315
Within his first ten days, the warden issued several directives regarding policy
both for the inmates and for the officers, much to the satisfaction of the union.316 He
also directed the officers to maintain a “‘spit and polish’ image” and to refer to
inmates as with proper titles (i.e. “Mr.”).317 In response, inmates were expected to
show the same respect by referring to the correctional officers as “officer”.318 If
inmates were to strike an officer, they would receive thirty days in segregation and
restricted visitation.319 These directives also served to reestablish a chain of
command. He also maintained that he would be the “official spokesperson” for the
prison, in an effort to cut down the very public nature of the feuds within the prison
environment.320 It is clear that Warden Mullen valued the safety of his workers and it
was a foremost concern for his administration. Also, by attempting to cut down the
statements to the press, this policy would also work to improve labor relations
between the administrators/managers and the workers. This was a marked change
from policy in the past.
The inmates of maximum were placed in lockup in May, by the request of the
officers.321 This was in response to threats and bad behavior. The union voted to
reinstitute a lockup themselves “as long as necessary until the administration put
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together some type of program that brings about a degree of order”.322 Confrontations
were escalating between officers and inmates. Two specific instances prompted direct
action on the part of the union. The first involved an inmate threatening an officer
with a baseball bat. The second involved inmates forcing the officer to open up a door
to a section of the prison, using threats of force. They had begun to use their numbers
to force officers into certain actions or keep officers from performing their duties.323
President Galligan stated: “It had become absolutely impossible for the officers to
function.”324 Galligan cited problems with smuggled contraband in the form of
weapons, drugs, and alcohol, in addition to the inmates’ ability to essentially roam
about freely and idly.325 The union believed that privileges should be gained based on
good behavior.326
Instituting a lockup (on their own initiative) was an action that had no
precedence. While the writers of the Providence Journal did not appear to support the
demands of the officers, it was clear that the union had taken the stance that it would
act on behalf of its members’ safety in the workplace.327 The newspaper described the
officers as being more “militant” in their labor actions in the past few years.328 The
union was described as generally “seeking a voice in prison operations”.329
This was the equivalent of a union “sit-in”. “Sit-ins” are used by labor
organizations for various reasons. The first reason is that the workers could not be
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merely replaced with more workers, in this case, the state police. It severely disrupts
the mode of “production”. The technique became popular in 1936 and 1937 and was
wildly effective, and was first widely publicized with the strike of the United Auto
Workers in Flint Michigan, the Works Progress Administration artists’ strike at the
WPA headquarters, and the strike at Firestone Tire Plant No. 1 in Akron, Ohio.330
This kind of a strike protected workers from the elements and from police forces
looking to engage them.331 The workers could use their workplace (usually a factory)
as a kind of fort.332 Management was much more willing to negotiate to get
“production” going again and to maintain their resources within the building. Galligan
justified the action by saying: “We’re not going to walk out on a situation. We’ve got
a job to do and we’re going to do it right.”333 However, as a labor tactic, this was one
that elicited an immediate response.
The very next day, Governor Noel announced some major changes that would
be instituted to “improve security,” which would in turn make the working conditions
of the officers easier.334 The plan would hire additional correctional officers,
eliminate overtime, install a new guard tower, and move awaiting trial prisoners from
maximum security to medium security. Also, the governor announced the beginning
of a $195,000 federally funded inmate training program, created a “Director of
Education” job, and also established a psychological treatment program.
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June of 1973 proved that things would become more difficult for the officers
before they got any easier. Officers were constantly under siege as the violence
escalated further. While inmates in maximum were under lockup, inmates in the
medium security facility became more psychically aggressive with the officers. On
June 1st, one officer was assaulted an injured and another locked in a cell after being
threatened at knifepoint.335 On June 3rd, three officers (Donald Price, James Nagy, and
Reginald Wilcox) were seized and held at knifepoint for a half an hour while inmates
negotiated conditions in the prison.336 Two more officers (Lt. Edward McKenna and
Leo Duffy) were held hostage for a half an hour on June 10th. 337 At this point,
Governor Noel realized that some action needed to be taken. He angrily ordered
officials at the ACI use “whatever means are necessary” to control the prison.338 He
also made sure to infer that the court decisions of Judge Pettine had constrained both
Warden Howard and the present administration, but his order was meant to provide for
the safety of the staff and surrounding community even if it came into direct conflict
with the decisions of Judge Pettine.339 In other words, if the orders of Judge Pettine
were putting lives at risk, they were to be disregarded.340 He ended statements in
saying: “”We’re going to protect those prison guards and we’ll take whatever
measures we have to do that.”341
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Yet, all of this was to no avail. On June 22, 1973, Officer Donald Price was
stabbed to death in the medium security section, at the age of 24.342 Officer Price was
new on the job, only having been there a few weeks.343 Lt. Ken Rivard refers to this
as a pivotal moment for the ACI and for the union.344 After this, officials and the
public began to take the daily problems and conditions facing the officers much more
seriously.345 Retired Captain Ronald Brodeur was hired just after the death of Officer
Price. He says that Rhode Island has been “lucky” since the death of Officer Price in
1973, as they have not had to experience this again. He attributes this to the “efforts
of the Brotherhood” who “fought tooth and nail” to protect its officers.346 It is clear
that each officer knew that it could have been them who was murdered. Those who
knew Officer Price felt the loss and anger toward this tragedy and were certain to
make sure that this did not happen again.
This murder brought about, what the Providence Journal would term, a
“backlash”.347 Governor Noel asked for the General Assembly to pass legislation
making the murder of a correctional officer or any person within the prison punishable
by the death penalty.348 Officers were defined as being “angry, bitter, and most of all,
united”.349 One officer explained: “I just don’t see how any officer could go back in
with the feeling that nothing has happened.”350 Many questioned why Officer Price
was targeted, and most just seemed to believe that it was just because he was an
342
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officer, nothing more.351 John Galligan made it clear that every officer who was offduty would be at the officer’s funeral on the following Monday, in uniform.352
Unfortunately, at the same time, training for officers was cut from six weeks
down to two, in an attempt to bolster the forces at the prison.353 The legislature was
now moved to act to hire twenty-five more officers.354 Legislation that mandated
death by hanging for anyone who committed a murder “while committed to
confinement” at the ACI made its way through the General Assembly.355 This was
changed to death by the gas chamber and was passed on June 26th (four days after the
murder).356 Guards showed up in support of the legislation, and were shown in the
paper looking solemn in uniform in the Senate chambers.357
Governor Noel then, in a rather startling move, approved a plan to hire seventy
seven more officers and five more kitchen and hospital workers.358 This fell in line
with his original plan to cut overtime, although it is likely that the number of officers
hired may have increased since the death of Officer Price. As for the financing, Noel
said that he would defer the cost by proposing a deficiency appropriation bill in the
1974 legislative session.359
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Meanwhile, pandemonium continued at the ACI when an escape tunnel, dug
by ten inmates, was found.360 This tunnel had been suspected for months but now a
more vigorous search was conducted by the state police since the murder a week
earlier.361 Thirty inmates who were consistently inciting trouble and violence were
placed in a “special cellblock,” to keep them from interacting with the other
prisoners.362 Director of corrections, Anthony Travisano, was quoted as saying:
“Some of them may never see the light of day again, and you can quote me on that.”363
It was his intention to make sure that the entire prison population did not pay for the
sins of the others.364
In response to this violence, administrators and politicians both took immediate
action to remedy some of the most pressing security concerns the officers brought
forth. Management attempted to gain improve the communications systems fairly
quickly by making attempts to obtain radio communications devices for the officers.365
They required federal funding and, unfortunately, bureaucracy hindered the progress
of obtaining these devices. This was not just for riots, but also for every day usage.366
$90,000 of federal funds were approved for a new communications system at the ACI
in October.367 It was also clear that state troopers would be needed at posts for a few
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more months.368 Governor Noel also established a special force within the state police
department to be ready to handle disturbances at the ACI at a moment’s notice.369 The
administration discovered that it was difficult to find new employees to fill the forty
six vacant positions, as new officers kept quitting.370 The warden also began to back
the privatization of various shops within the ACI (instead of being owned by the
state).371 The year ended with the claim that the ACI had “gain[ed] new security” in
that there were numerous physical improvements being made to the facilities as well
as a good working relationship between the officers and the warden.372 The most
positive development of the year was that officer safety gained its rightful place in the
public discourse and was now a matter of public concern. However, not everything
was positive as December saw yet another inmate disturbance in which fifty inmates
had a giant brawl in the dining area.373 It was clear there was still a great deal of work
to do.
Also at the end of 1973, RIBCO held an election. The union elected a new
president, Eugene Fagnant.374 Also elected in 1973 were: Robert Mertz for vice
president, Robert Jenckes as second vice president, Robert Blanchard as secretary,
Albert Gardner as financial secretary, and Joseph Montecalvo as recording
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secretary.375 The union closed out 1973 with the rejection a two-year contract offer
due to an insufficient salary being offered.376 The union also argued for improvements
to the state retirement system, for financial protection against lawsuits against officers,
and for the “liberalizing” of pay benefits offered to injured officers (including
improved medical coverage).377 New RIBCO president, Gene Fagnant explained that
the pay and benefits need to be better in order to attract and keep new officers.378
These were concerns that would continue throughout 1974.
1974: Protecting Officers At All Costs
1974 was characterized by contract negotiations, work stoppages by officers in
response to assaults, more discussions over prisoners’ rights and prison reform, and
more schemes for how to best reorganize the ACI so that it would function without
disruption. Overall, this year showed a weakening of the administration’s resolve to
protect its workers and not give in to the demands of the inmates. Officers now had an
established procedure put into place to protect their interests, yet they needed to make
sure that it worked as it was intended to work. It was very clear throughout this year
that the priority of the union was the safety of the officers above all else. For the first
half of the year, RIBCO demonstrated its strength and militancy through threats of job
actions or job actions themselves. In the second half of the year, RIBCO promised the
governor that they would give up work stoppages, if their procedure was properly
implemented and their officers were protected. This was a large concession for the
union to make, particularly as the administration’s resolve appeared to be breaking
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down. However, it was the only option for the union as it was the most responsible
route for the safety of the prison and the governor had taken a stricter stance against
work stoppages. The union, in an attempt to fix the problems with maximum security,
requested a study which would investigate why medium security ran productively and
securely while maximum was in such a state of chaos. Union officials hoped that an
outside committee would find that tension between the administration and officers was
to blame. Overall, the union demonstrated throughout the year that they were willing
to work with management and state officials until their safety was disregarded.
The year began on a tumultuous note as fifty-five inmates refused to go back to
their cells, demanding more recreation time.379 All of these inmates were awaiting
trial, none of them were serving sentences.380 The state police responded quickly and
the incident appeared to have been solved by the warden agreeing to make
“adjustments” to recreation times on the following day.381 This set precedence for
more inmate action, as the inmates found that this tactic would get them concessions
from the administration.
New officers, just out of training, described the ACI as a “mess”382 The new
officers blamed this mess partially on the rulings by Judge Pettine and partially on the
unwillingness of officers because there was no one willing to start a “one-man crusade
for uniformity of regulations of enforcement”.383 Officers, in response to this, defend
their lack of action by explaining that their administrators do not support them when
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they do try to report on an inmate because it is “almost too involved to be worth the
trouble” due to Pettine’s regulations. 384 Travisano, head of corrections, expected to
solve this by printing up a new book of regulations within that same week.385 This
would not solve the fact that the administrators within the prison were unwilling to
support the officers in confrontations. Inactivity and loitering were the two major
problems that remained unsolved, according to a Providence Journal writer who
toured with the new officers.386 As David Narsavage, Providence Journal writer put
it: “What he’s spending six weeks to prepare himself for is to go behind bars, armed
with only a whistle, grossly outnumbered by inmates, to work for about $3.70 an
hour.” What this article did not bring to light was that the officers had to be prepared
to do this and not be supported by the administration when trying to follow their
guidelines. This would be a source of major contention for the rest of the year.
Taking into consideration the lack of good relations between the workers and
management, it was unsurprising that negotiations for the new contract for the
upcoming year were not going well. The executive board threatened to refuse all
overtime due to the fact that negotiations were dead-locked.387 This action was
condemned as “irresponsible” by the governor, however it was effective in gaining
them a meeting for the following day.388 The governor, in an effort to break the dead-
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lock in negotiations then offered to change the contract from two years to one year,
giving the union an opportunity to renegotiate the following year.389 The one year
contract would contain an increase of eleven percent.390 The governor essentially
ignored all of the pension plan requests and requests regarding incentives for those
with college training.391 The union ultimately rejected this plan and produced a
counter-proposal in which they had a two-year contract with options for renegotiating
after the first year was done.392 They still had qualms with the wages and the
retirement plan put forth.393 Governor Noel was then, in a later article in the
Providence Journal, quoted as saying that he was confident that the officers would not
hold a slow-down in the prison.394 This then prompted an immediate slow-down of
the officers, who clearly did not appreciate the statement. Fifty-three officers turned
down an extra shift (stating they were ill), and state troopers as well as new recruits
were assigned to their posts.395 Travisano stated that if necessary, he would “order”
the men to work and produce evidence of illness, if necessary.396 Officers displayed
their frustration in informing the press that they had been negotiating for three months,
to no avail.397 The union offered up yet another contract proposal, which was then
rejected by Governor Noel.398 Officers then accepted overtime shifts in an attempt to
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persuade the governor to reconsider.399 It seemed that attempts to strong arm
Governor Noel into discussing matters with them would not be effective. After five
months of negotiating and still no contract, RIBCO president Fagnant explained that
his members could not accept the governor’s rejection of their overtures at a
compromise and that job action should be expected as a result.400 This prompted some
response from the governor’s office. They finally reached an agreement on February
13 which did not provide for a wage reopener at the end of the year, however they
were given additional money at the end of the year to compensate.401 Both sides
pushed as far as they could and total job action was not something that either side
wanted to risk, as it would jeopardize any progress made in the prison.
In the meantime, there were many proposals as to what path of action would be
best for the ACI to undertake for progress to occur. Some rumors of plans to relocate
the ACI were circulating.402 Corrections director, Travisono, stated that there was a
team of consultants from Illinois who were devising ten to fifteen different approaches
for bringing change to the ACI.403 About ten days later, Travisono stated that
institutions would remain in Cranston, even if they had to build a new facility, much to
the dismay of Cranston mayor Taft.404 In the following months, Travisano was quite
indecisive on the exact direction of the development of the ACI. All of these
directions implied major policy changes and also implied a change in the working
environments of all officers. Eventually the consultants recommended a plan that
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focused on community involvement, a focus on rehabilitation, and an expanded use of
probation and called for the establishment of four community-oriented centers.405 The
report also gave options for renovating or rebuilding the facilities yet argued that $7.5
million that was authorized by voters would not be enough to cover this kind of a
plan.406 While these plans were admirable in their idealistic nature, many questioned
the feasible nature of such a plan. This would have meant extreme change in a very
short period of time, something that had not proven to work well in the past. Retired
Captain and former RIBCO President, Ron Brodeur explains the pattern of the
Department of Corrections regarding consultants. Outside consultants were brought in
and attempt to create plans and cut staff and, in the meantime, millions of dollars were
wasted in trying to come up with these ideas, as they were not feasible.407 This was a
pattern that continued through the 1970’s and into the 1980’s.
Corrections director Travisano also had a significant problem with the amount
of overtime that was still occurring, despite the governor’s ban on overtime in the
previous year.408 This amount of overtime amounted to $800,000.409 In response
President Fagnant charged the “mismanagement” of the state Department of
Corrections as being the reason for such a high amount of overtime, not officers who
take “unneeded sick leave”.410 This is a debate that will carry on through the decades
despite numerous attempts to remedy the situation.
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The administration had also failed its officers by not adequately reinforcing
established procedure that was in place to protect the officers. The administration did
not view the safety of the officers as its major priority and this resulted in job action.
On July 16, officers refused to report to work because an inmate who fought with an
officer (Officer Louis Ward) was not dealt with in a manner consistent with the
established procedure.411 Originally, the strike was not a union action, yet later in the
day the union voted to support it.412 The decision not to place the inmate in
segregation came from the fact that no other officer was around to witness the fight.413
President Fagnant stated: “The question is the safety of the employees. If they
(superiors) don’t look out for our welfare, we will have to look out for our own.”414
Some officers argued that Warden Mullen had broken his promise and also believed
that some inmates got preferential treatment and that the officers were receiving less
support from their administrators.415 The officers refused to go to work even though
they had a contract, and thus Governor Noel fired them.416 Noel called Fagnant and
said to him that they ought to settle the matter quickly or they would be “looking for
other jobs”.417 This was the first time Guardsmen had been called to the ACI, and
they were called to supplement the state police who were already at their limits.418 In
a phone call with the governor, Fagnant explained: “They’d rather be out of a job than
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be killed or see a fellow officer hurt or killed in the line of duty.”419 One officer
stated: “What would have happened if he (Ward) had died?”420 With the murder of
Officer Price still fresh in their minds, they took their vow to make sure they protected
each other to heart, as a true Brotherhood would do.
This was settled on the evening of July 17, as officers agreed to call off work
stoppages “as a labor tactic” and Noel stated that he would rehire all of the officers
that he fired the previous day.421 The governor reiterated the fact that inmates are
entitled to a hearing before being placed into segregation, unless they are deemed
dangerous. (This particular inmate was fighting with the officer in order to maintain
possession of hacksaw blades, which many found to be reason enough to deem him
dangerous.) The inmate was to be charged by the state police.422 While union
officials had to accept this as a form of protection for the officers, rank and file
officers were quite angry by the turn of events stating: “That’s what you get for
backing up a man who was assaulted-canned.” And “Inmates have all the rights and
the officers have none.”423 The union merely had to survive to fight another day and
needed to accept the state police investigation as the only protection they would have
in this kind of a situation. Many were concerned because the problems the union had
still remained and they had made some serious concessions in the process. Work
stoppages were a major tool to gain attention and action when nothing else would. In
the end, the inmate who was charged did receive thirty days on the end of his
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sentence, as mandated by the law.424 But now, the union would need to follow union
grievance procedure instead of their more powerful tactics, militant tactics to make
progress.425
The next time an inmate assaulted an officer (in this particular case, two
officers), he threatened to kill an officer and there were witnesses to see the event.426
Therefore, the administration acted with swiftness and placed the inmate in
segregation pending a hearing, deeming him dangerous. Gene Fagnant was pleased
with the administrative actions.427 The inmate (Salvatore Ventre) was sentenced to
two years on the charges of kidnapping and assault with a dangerous weapon.428 It
was still unclear what would occur if an officer was in the unlucky predicament of not
having witnesses to corroborate their story.
The administration appeared to be making more concessions by allowing the
NPRA to hold a Family Day on August 11th, with plans to hold one on the following
month.429 Six hundred guests came into the prison to visit two hundred inmates.430
Officers were openly skeptical, feeling that the inmates had just been on their best
behavior right before the picnic so that it would not be cancelled, like the previous
year.431 Even the inmates referred to the event as a “pacifier”.432 Officers and
administrators were extremely against such events due to the chaotic nature of them
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and the complete lack of security or decorum that ensued.433 While the administration
appeared to be taken a tough stance, it seemed as though they were still catering to the
inmate groups (like the NPRA) as a means of maintaining control. That kind of
control was not long lasting. It also put officers at risk with contraband being brought
in. It was impossible for such a small officer staff to be able to supervise all activities
and provide adequate security when eight hundred people are gathered in mass and six
hundred of them have come in from the outside. This would pose a problem for
officers right up through the administration of William Laurie (Assistant Director of
Adult Services), who understood the problems that major events like this caused, and
worked to shut them down.434
Violence continued to escalate after the Family Day, as predicted, and charges
of brutality against the officers were brought to court.435 Warden Mullen attempted to
regain control by ordering a general lock-up of all of the inmates.436 However, this did
nothing to quell tensions as then four officers were attacked, most notably, one was
stabbed and one scalded with hot coffee.437 This angered the inmates and they became
more physically aggressive toward the officers. Largely, the lack of consistency in
administrative response led to the increase in frustration among the inmates (in

433

William Laurie, Interview with the author, May 3, 2011.
Kenneth Rivard, interview with the author, March 29, 2011.
434
Ibid.
435
“3 Guards Injured in Fight at ACI,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, August 15, 1974, A1.
“ACI Prisoners Brutality Case Ruling is Near,” The Providence Evening Bulletin, August 15, 1974, B6.
436
David Korb, “Mullen orders lock-up at ACI after stabbing, assault cases,” The Providence Journal,
August 16, 1974, A1.
437
Paul Giacobbe, “4 Guards Assaulted at State Prison,” The Providence Journal, August 20, 1974, B1.
One of the inmates that was involved in the new assault was none other than Mr. Salvatore Ventre, the
inmate who had already received two years for kidnapping and assault with a dangerous weapon.
Ibid.

90

addition to the officers). It was clear that this new way of dealing with violence would
not work.
Administrative policy became even more haphazard as the year progressed.
On September 15, in maximum security, an officer was assaulted and had his life
threatened after a fight between two inmates.438 The officer involved quit directly
after. The administration “spent several hours pleading with him [the inmate]” to go
into a cell in the segregation unit. He was then allowed to wander back to his original
cell. Inmates were locked up and correctional officers were ready for any impending
trouble and were suited up in riot gear. The inmate involved then denied assaulting
the officer, despite witnesses. Officials said that they would administer a lie detector
test the following day. The officer who quit stated on his way out: “The brass are not
sufficiently aware of the institution’s problems.”439 This demonstrated a true
breakdown in the tough stance of the administration from the year before. It appeared
to be inevitable that the officers would be thrust right back into the chaos that had
previously existed, and now had promised to refrain from job actions to bring about
change. It appeared as though their hard won gains, which were few and far between,
were falling by the wayside.
In response to all of these threats and violent attacks on officers, RIBCO began
a statewide drive for a union health and welfare fund.440 This was a great way to gain
public support and also monetary strength as a union. In the earliest years, such
fundraising was necessary to cover what the members were not receiving in benefits,
438
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particularly with regard to injury on the job.441 The officers were also determined to
set up a fund for the family of Officer Price, in the form of a trust fund for his son.442
The officers, in a very noble gesture, explained to the public that: “We don’t feel Mrs.
Price got what she should have gotten.”443 They were extremely loyal to his memory
and realized that they would need to remain united and vigilant on all fronts, both on
an everyday scale and also with regard to the bigger picture to remain safe and secure.
They realized that the Brotherhood also encompassed the families who sent their loved
ones into literal battle every single day, and they worked to also protect these families.
Officers were also finding that charges by the inmates were now gaining
validity within the court system. U.S. District Court Raymond Judge Pettine, who
often ruled in ACI cases, determined that three officers had in fact committed
brutality.444 President Fagnant replied that he believed this opened the doors to more
inmate “harassment” of the officers within the realm of the courts.445 A probe that
was ordered by the governor returned which stated that there was no “widespread
brutality” within the ACI, despite the various claims of the inmates.446
The union who felt they had no other alternative requested a study regarding
maximum security, suggesting that they were “so engrossed in [their] own problems
[they were] not running the institution.”447 All of the litigation, legislative
committees, and studies prevented officers and the administration from working to
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solve problems within the ACI. Also, it harmed labor relations between the workers
and the employees. The officers of the union felt they were not supported by their
administration. In asking for the report, they asked that the committee look into
reasons why relations and security at medium security were significantly better while
maximum security struggled and officers were seriously assaulted on a regular basis.
The union hoped that the committee would discover that the problems were a result of
“friction between administrators of maximum security and prison guards”.448 Fagnant
argued that procedure in maximum changed “day to day” while in medium, procedure
was uniformly enforced.449 The union was angry due to the fact that disciplinary
reports “often disappear[ed]” and the administration often reversed the decisions of the
officers.450 Fagnant argued that this was causing “low morale” among the workers.451
In addition to this, it was argued that this lack of uniform enforcement of the rules was
leading to the numerous assaults.452 Something needed to be done to remedy the
impending disaster, and the union reverted back to some of its previous tactics to try to
force action from the administration.
The year ended with a plan to transfer seventy two inmates out of maximum to
the medium security building, while awaiting trial inmates would be moved back to
maximum.453 This was proposed by the administration to remedy the chaos within
maximum security. It seemed like a reasonable solution, however, the awaiting trial
inmates did not agree. They refused to leave the building, in fear of vicious assaults
448
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that would likely take place by maximum security inmates, and engaged in a hunger
strike.454 The year of 1975 began with a lawsuit on behalf of the awaiting trial
inmates. The impending suit by these inmates was, after three days of testimony,
dismissed due to the fact that the state did not have the funds to carry out the transfer
of prisoners.455
1975: Increasing Cooperation as the Path to Success
Throughout the year of 1975, the union focused on working with the
administration, as the administration made officer safety a higher priority. The
officers and the administration had to work together to comply with court orders and
to regain control. The year saw a dramatic increase in the amount of litigation and
legislation regarding the inmates’ rights. The governor looked to institute a shorter
work week for state employees to cut costs during the recession, which would be
challenged and won by the union. The improvement in communication between the
officers and the administration (both middle management and within the Department
of Corrections) was crucial to progress throughout this year. Modified lockups were
put into place with the assistance of armed state troopers, which helped to ensure the
safety of the officers. Also, contract negotiations went well when compared with
negotiations of the past. The union demands centered on benefits and the protection of
the seniority clause. The administration seemed to gain a clearer sense of what
direction they wished to take, which helped to make working conditions and labor
negotiations better for all.
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This was a year of economic downturn for the state of Rhode Island and the
effects of this downturn were being felt on multiple levels of the state prison system.
February 1975, was a month of a lot of action on a couple of fronts, in which a lack of
state funds was demonstrated to be at the root of many of the problems at the ACI .
The first front involved a lawsuit that was being filed against the governor and the
Department of Corrections by the inmates, who believed that they were not provided
with medical treatment or vocational and educational training.456 Secondly, the
governor had also been considering a shorter work week and harsher penalties
regarding overtime.457 This incited the rage of the union, and union officials argued
that the cutback would hamper already limited operations within the prisons.458 One
lieutenant that was interviewed argued that officers had to work overtime to keep the
facility, which was understaffed, secure. They did not feel it was a luxury, but a
burden. The union viewed the governor’s order as unrealistic.459 The captains and
lieutenants did not report to work in protest of the new orders from the governor’s
office.460 With a short-staffed institution now under even greater work constraints, the
conditions for the inmates deteriorated and they rebelled. On February 27, 1975,
inmates took over two areas of maximum security and officers had to lock themselves,
and the civilian staff into a separate area of the prison to be safe.461 One control was
regained, the administration tried to continue with normal routine. However, they
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inmates then took over areas of the prison again. One hundred state and local police
came into the prison in response, in both instances. A general lockup was ordered
directly after the second incident.462 This proves that when funding was cut for these
institutions, both the inmates and the officers suffered.
Officers brought the Noel order to court, asking that the court declare it
void.463 They argued that it violated the collective bargaining agreement between the
state and the union. They also argued that the order violated the constitutional rights
of the officers with regard to due process and equal protection. In August, an
arbitrator ruled that Governor Noel violated the terms of the correctional officers’
contract when setting the overtime rules, and thus ruled in favor of the union.464 The
union was vindicated, although this would not solve all of the problems that existed
before the order was put into place. Noel said that he would appeal the decision in the
Supreme Court stating that “people out there think they can take a day off when they
want and come back when they want”.465 President Fagnant charged the governor
with completely “distort[ing] the issues” and stated that “abuse of sick leave” should
be punished, not “use of sick leave”.466 Fagnant then stated: “Noel was elected
Governor, not God…” “…If he wants a responsible labor organization, then the state
must have responsible management.”467
The governor’s office and the Department of Corrections began to gain a
clearer sense of direction throughout 1975. In April, Governor Noel submitted three
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bills for ACI reform. One would offer opportunities for vocational training for
inmates. Another would grant employment opportunities through private industries
working within the ACI. Lastly, the third would grant furloughs up to fourteen days,
for various reasons.468 While some of these reforms would bring in needed activity
and productivity to the prison system, they also created some security hazards with
regard to the lack of security that could result from private industries coming into and
leaving the prison facilities each day as well as the issues furloughs created with
regard to officer supervision.
At this point, the ACI entered into an era in which a great debate regarding the
opening of new facilities ensued. The idea of a “Supermaximum” security prison was
brought forth by Senator Joeseph W. Walsh, which would be funded by $7.5 million
in bond money.469 This idea was supported by RIBCO, which acknowledged that the
“incorrigible” inmates of maximum needed to be brought under control before the
prison could be reformed.470 Other plans were also proceeding forward with the
development of an intake and diagnostic area as well as a separate space for awaiting
trial inmates.471 In November, the ACI subcommittee to the Governor’s Advisory
Commission on Correctional Services recommended to the full commission that first
priority be given to the construction of the intake/diagnostic center.472 These plans
would require the public’s approval (as they required a great deal of money), which
would prove to be problematic in the following year.
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Relations between Warden Mullen and the officers appeared to have greatly
improved. Mullen, had recently instituted a series of lockup in response to violence
(involving stabbings and assaults among inmates), and the union supported his actions
thoroughly and publicly.473 Mullen advocated a partial lockup plan in which only a
segment of the three hundred and fifty inmates would be allowed out of their cells at
any one time.474 Fagnant argued that, for the situation to improve, the officers needed
to support the warden, who had now taken a firmer stance. He was quoted as saying
that the officers supported the warden in “his attempt to take control of the prison out
of the hands of the inmate population and return it to the people responsible for
running the prison.”475
As the administration began to discuss plans for a further modified lockup plan
(in response to the orders of Judge Pettine), the union threatened a walkout.476 The
union felt the inmates were still not ready for a further modified lockup. Also, union
officials felt the need to assert more control on the shop-floor and wanted to take back
some control from the court system. Administrators met with officers and offered to
them a chance to submit their own plans for ending the lockup. The lockup had been
going on for two weeks, and thus was pushing the boundaries allowed by Judge
Pettine. Some officers were unhappy with the lockup because, as inmates were fed in
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their cells, they threw trash, food, and other “debris” at the officers.477 The lockup
was modified on November 13, with some of the suggestions put forth by the union.478
It appeared as though the administrators within the Department of Corrections
began to realize the need to regain control before reforms could be implemented. As
the modified lockup was put into place, fifty additional state troopers were on hand to
assist with maintaining control.479 The troopers were armed. Donald Taylor, now
acting director of the Department of Corrections, explained that the “archaic prison
structure” was to blame for many of the problems within the prison.480 He stated:
“Those people who have been crying for rehabilitative programs – and I
include myself among them – will have to realize that we must begin at the
bottom and regain control first.”481
This shows a departure from the policies of the past and an understanding that reform
and security do not necessarily go hand in hand. Security must be established before
reform programs can be effective.
However, to do this, officials had to first demonstrate to the court (namely
Judge Pettine), that the lockup was following his previous orders regarding prisoners’
rights and the conditions of the prison.482 In response to the correctional officials’ bid
to maintain the lockup, Judge Pettine warned that he would close the state prisons if
they would not comply with his rulings.483 Acting corrections director Taylor,
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consistently stated that the antiquated facilities made it impossible to run “proper
prisoner programs”.484 He also argued that the staff did not have the “luxury” of being
able to separate the instigators from the other inmates, and thus, the conditions had to
be imposed on the entire population.485 More importantly, this shows that the union
would not shy away from challenging the courts.
RIBCO held an election in November, for another two year term. Running
unopposed were Gene Fagnant for president, Albert Gardiner for first vice president,
Alan Silverman for treasurer, and Kenneth Rivard for financial secretary. Louis Ward
was elected second vice president and Edward Petrarca was elected recording
secretary.486 The fact that four of these men ran for positions unopposed suggests a
high degree of satisfaction with the leadership on the part of the membership.
The union, up to this point, had greatly increased the pay scale of the officers.
Now the union officials began to work on increasing the benefits of the officers.
RIBCO had been in contract negotiations since June, to no avail. In December, union
officials walked out of a meeting with state negotiators, when the negotiators
withdrew an offer that had previously been agreed upon.487 Three major items were
included within this: a fifteen minute briefing before the start of the shift (on overtime
pay), a shift differential increase, and three paid personal days.488 Again, talks
between the union and state officials failed on the 19th of December.489 This time,
negotiators for both sides were stuck on the seniority clause, which the state argued
484
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that the clause must be eliminated. Attorney for the union, Gerard Cobleigh argued
that the state should show specifically how the clause would affect the operation of the
prison.490 This clause was the basis for all union rules regarding bidding for jobs,
bidding for shifts, and anything else that could be chosen by the worker. Union
members stood firmly behind this principle as being the fairest way to conduct
business within the prison. Eventually the union and the state came to an agreement
which increased the benefits of the officers and left the seniority clause intact, which
was a victory for the union.491
1976: Perseverance in the Face of Adversity
The year of 1976 saw a continuation of many of the same financial dilemmas
and racial tensions of the past. As racial tensions escalated within the prison,
confrontations between officers and inmates were inevitable (if only because most of
the staff was white). Officers were caught in the middle of battles between prisoners
and often caught the brunt of the violence. The public, during this economic
recession, refused to offer any means of economic support and voted against various
bond issues that would improve the infrastructure of the institutions. Until the public
got on board with the administration and the officers’ union, the system remained in a
state of controlled chaos.
As with every other public sector union during times of fiscal crisis, state
legislators began to launch more frequent attacks regarding extra money being spent
on the workers. The union came under fire again on sick leave, as legislators argued
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that private industry did not have nearly the same amount of sick time being taken.492
The union, in response, attacked these legislators as “ill-informed people who make
irrational statements” about prisons and what goes on in the ACI.493 He also argued
that Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) was not available to state employees,
because they did not pay into the state insurance system.494 It should also be noted
that the high degree of assaults does not occur in any other job atmosphere due to the
nature of the work.
A special legislative committee was established to answer questions as to why
there was still so much money being spent on overtime.495 Two years previously,
ninety seven officer positions were created. However, one year previously, the
administration had created thirty two posts beyond what was authorized. The
overtime issue appeared to be an administrative problem. Also, officers were still
undertaking tasks that were out of their skill set, such as delivering mail, reception
work, working in the clothing room, working in the general store, or driving the trucks
of materials.496 Also, studies on the effective use of officers were drawn up but then
never used by the Department of Corrections.497 Strong union personality Hector
Poulin, grievance chair for RIBCO at the time, argued that the high overtime was “not
the result of games being played by correctional officers.”498 The legislative
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committee chair, Robert Sweeney, asked Poulin to make some recommendations to
the committee as to modifications that could be made.499
Internally, the year of 1976 provided some structural changes for the union. In
March, President Gene Fagnant left the ACI to go to work for Council 70 of the
American Federation of State, Country, and Municipal Employees.500 Ironically, this
is the same Council 70 that the Brotherhood had left to create an independent union.
Albert Gardner took the place of acting president of the guards’ union.
Also in 1976, the issue of sex-bias between facilities became a hot-button
topic. Gloria McDonald (a lieutenant) was first on the list for promotion to captain
and informed her superiors that she would expect a promotion when a vacancy opened
up, even if it was in the maximum security section.501 At that time, maximum security
was an all-male facility and the staff was entirely male. Many feared that, with the
checkered past of the facility, a female officer was at more risk within the facility
(particularly with regard to sexual assault). Many, including those on the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, argued that male nurses, instructors,
counselors, and therapists were allowed to work in the women’s facility and thus,
females should be allowed to work in the all-male facility.502 Equal employment
opportunities would be brought to fruition in 1979, when the union supported
grievances on behalf of senior female officers (in accordance with the seniority
principle).
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The unrest within the prison was far from dissipated. New members of middle
management made a difference in how unrest was handled, however. In July of 1976,
the union (under the leadership of Albert Gardner), requested a meeting with the
Department of Corrections to discuss the growing unrest among inmates.503 Another
lockup was imposed due to concern over inmates arming themselves with items such
as swords and clubs.504 It is because of this that William Laurie, new assistant director
of corrections for adult services at the time (with all of the rights and responsibilities
of a warden), ordered the lockup and also had no qualms about calling the state police
whenever there was an uprising.505 He argued that there were four hundred inmates,
who were armed, up against twenty officers (if that) in an open area, armed merely
with a whistle.506 He knew the officers would not stand a chance. 507 In an attempt to
gain the confidence of the officers and create a better working relationship with them,
he would always go into a hazardous situation with them.508 This helped to further
improve relations between management and the workers, as Laurie provided an
example of an administrator who would not ask workers to do something that he was
not willing to do. He was willing to literally stand with the officers in the face of
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conflict, which was rare and yet created a great deal of respect between middle
management and the workers.
Conflict was inevitable without any major structural change. A melee broke
out in August, across racial lines.509 African American inmates accused white inmates
and white officers of setting up the situation. Seven inmates were confined to
segregation following the fighting. The American Civil Liberties Union argued for a
full, public investigation of the incident.510 Governor Noel appointed a commission
involving all outside members, due to the charge that the officers themselves were
involved.511 The claims of racial conspiracy were later ruled to be unfounded.512 As a
result of the explosive situation, a minor riot occurred on August 8th, in which eleven
inmates and three officers were injured.513 In addition to the racial tensions (both
between officers and inmates and between inmate groups), overcrowding was also
becoming a factor in the escalating tensions.514 As racial tensions died down in later
years, overcrowding provided the cause for inmate rebellion. Though the rebellions
would not be as frequent, they were still major, violent, and destructive. The only way
to fix this was with money to provide a better infrastructure and badly needed
programs.
October and November were important months as the upcoming elections
decided major bond issues for the ACI. A$13.9 million bond issue was put up for the
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voters’ decision and would provide improvements to the facilities as well as better
treatment of inmates awaiting trial.515 Many argued that a newly instituted lockup was
linked to the impending referendum vote.516 The bond did not pass.517 In addition,
jobs within the ACI for inmates were hurt by federal statutes that prohibited goods
produced by inmates from being shipped out of state, which hurt local industries. 518
Any gains that were made were being hindered by bonds not passing or federal
statutes. The year ended in a state of disillusionment and dismay on the part of the
officers and the administration alike.
1977: The Beginning of Change
The year of 1977 was the last in the series of formative years. The Department
of Corrections, the governor, the middle managers, and the union appeared to be
largely coming together on major issues and found that the only way that change
would come about was through a significant increase in the resources available to the
prison. The public appeared to recognize this unity and organization and began to
trust that their money would be well-spent by those in charge of the ACI.
The year was characterized by the new gubernatorial leadership of Joseph
Garrahy. Governor Garrahy promised, as a key position within his inaugural address,
that “rehabilitation is the key objective of our correctional efforts”.519 The federal
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime threatened to withdraw money for the four
drug counselors it was funding at the ACI if the administration did not make some
515
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serious headway with regard to a decent drug program by the beginning of March.520
While they had the space for such a program, it was argued that they needed additional
officers to staff the unit. Garrahy, however, felt that they could meet the TASC
demands without hiring new personnel.521 Also, directly after taking office, Governor
Garrahy approved a $300,000 appropriation for a permanent maintenance unit for the
ACI (including plumbers, carpenters, and electricians).522 Garrahy was also trying to
hold onto a $60,000 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Association, which
also threatened to withdraw its money if they did not meet federal guidelines regarding
drug treatment.523
A majority of the problem facing Governor Garrahy was the public’s lack of
faith in the correctional system. In an interesting article by Bob Wyss (of April 1977),
Wyss summed up the confusion in the following paradox: “The ACI a ‘Country club’
or a hellhole?”524 This captured the essence of the arguments on both the officers’
side and the prisoners’ side. On one side, state police Sergeants were testifying that
prisoners had hot plates and were cooking lobster tails regularly. They also had small
refrigerators, coffee urns, radios, and television sets. In addition to this, they used the
NPRA telephones to create a bookmaking operation. On the other side, inmates
claimed that conditions were appalling and they were beaten and gassed. They
believed their punishments constituted “cruel and unusual punishments” under the
law. Courts mandated that inmates have a life that was comparable to what it would
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be like outside of the walls.525 The public was left genuinely confused by all of the
mixed messages they were receiving from the inmate organizations, the
administration, politicians, and the officers. The officers would suffer if they could
not all gain the public as allies in their struggle because of this confusion.
In response to all of the misperceptions, RIBCO asked that house legislators
actually visit the ACI.526 This invitation was extended by the union to members of the
House Finance Committee who questioned overtime payments for staff briefings.
These meetings, as explained by Kenneth Rivard (vice president and spokesperson for
RIBCO at the time), were crucial to the ongoing daily operations within the prison.
They kept the officers updated on any unrest or disturbances and helped significantly
with officer safety. Rivard explained that between 8 am and 9 pm the South State
Wing, which contains four cellblocks and three hundred and twenty four inmates, was
manned by only six officers (and some nights only four). He felt that legislators
clearly had inaccurate information, based on some of the “misleading” statements that
they had made, and he felt they should be offered an opportunity to obtain some
accurate information.527
At the same time, Theodore Gordon (a specialist in institutional hygiene from
Washington D.C.) found the prisons to be unfit for human habitation.528 Judge Pettine
then went to the facilities himself and agreed with this assessment. Gordon explained
that the major problem lay in the “age and design of the institution”.529 Inmates
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claimed they lacked supplies for cleaning. William Laurie, while testifying before the
judge, explained that he was in favor of replacing maximum security.530
Governor Garrahy, in a press conference, blasted the courts by stating that his
workers spend more time within the courthouse than at work.531 He explained that he
found ways to provide money for the system and that they were beginning to “turn the
corner.”532 Directly following this, the officers quit the panel established by Pettine,
arguing that they had their own grievances with the Department of Corrections and did
not have the time to be able to participate in such a panel.533
Apparently those grievances pertained to cutbacks. The Department of
Corrections announced, on May 19th, its intention to reduce the number of officers
assigned to each shift.534 In response to this, inmates and the union united to protest
the reduction in staff.535 Officers argued that this would leave them open to attacks
and explained that if they wished to cut costs, they should begin with administrative
costs.536 The union filed a complaint of unfair labor practices against their employer
for failing to abide by the binding arbitration within their recent contracts. This may
have served to prove to the public that the Department of Corrections was fiscally
responsible. Also, it is important to note that the union kept the confrontation from
turning to job action, by filing the complaint of unfair labor practices instead of
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turning to more extreme action. This created a sense of stability and a better working
relationship between the union and management.
Voters responded to the conditions within the ACI and the new working
relationship of the administration and the officers and approved $6 million for an
intake service center.537 Also, on June 27, construction for a Supermax facility
began.538 Finally the ACI was receiving the critical help it needed. Despite the
positive developments, there was another three hour revolt at the ACI in August.539
The armed response to the revolt was termed by many politicians as an “overreaction”,
which was also played up by the media.540 In response to the probe, William Laurie
walked out on the Senate probe led by Senator Fortunato, and was cheered on by thirty
correctional officers who went to support him.541 What was not released to the general
public was that William Laurie was directed to walk out on the probers by the
governor’s office.542 This incident was projected by the media as a demonstration of
the irresponsibility of the prison personnel.543
This was also a time of internal strife for the Brotherhood. Michael Solitro,
who had previously run for second vice president in November of 1975, was now
running for the presidency of the officer union.544 Solitro was a controversial figure
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within the union. A week prior to seeking the candidacy of the union, Solitro
delivered a letter to the governor himself, protesting the conditions within the
prison.545 This letter stated: “We [the guards] cannot accept the unnecessary burden of
our lives being put in jeopardy by sheer incompetence on the part of the current
administration of the Department of Corrections.”546 During this same time, new
Corrections Director Southworth had admitted that the inmates still exercised a great
deal of control over the facility.547 Solitro argued that some members were
“dissatisfied” with the way that the union had dealt with the problems in the prison.548
He argued that officers were being threatened by inmates (threats regarding
themselves and their families) and put in compromising situation, which forced them
to comply with inmates demands for favors.549 It is unclear what exactly Solitro
would change upon assuming the presidency of the union. In the meantime, the union
(under the presidency of Kenneth Rivard), had recently submitted a request to meet
with Southworth to discuss the issues still facing officers’ safety within the facilities
and the conditions within the facility at that time.550 In response to Solitro’s charge
that officers were coerced into granting the favors of inmates, Rivard explained that:
“The guards’ have nothing to give.”551 He argued that if prison rules were being
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broken and inmates were receiving favors, such as furloughs, the favors had to come
from the administration and not the officers themselves.552
Concurrently, Rivard also launched an attack on the rulings of Judge Pettine.553
Pettine had issued an extensive order to correct the conditions within the prisons on
August 10, 1977.554 Rivard spoke out against four major points: the charge that
officers were a major source of the drug problem at the ACI, the criticisms of the
medium security building, the proposal of a human rights commission that would be
allowed to transfer personnel, and the time limits set on the state for accomplishing the
various reforms put forth.555 Pettine also ordered that no contract between the ACI
and the union be signed until he had a chance to review it and make some changes.556
While the rulings of Judge Pettine ultimately helped to change the conditions at the
ACI, many criticized him for insinuating himself in areas that the judiciary should not
be involved in, such as labor negotiations.
In 1979 and 1980, the short-lived presidency of Michael Solitro caused the
union a lot of grief and discord. Solitro fired factions of the union who did not agree
with his philosophies. In addition to this, he ignored the union’s request that he not
meet with administrators alone regarding contract negotiations, on his own personal
time. The union felt that compromised the integrity of the Brotherhood and their
bargaining unit. He continued to have administrators over to his home for dinner. The
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union was informed of this and decided to hold a trial board in October of 1980
regarding these new developments. The board voted to oust Mr. Solitro from the
presidency of the union.557 At this point, Ronald Brodeur was brought in as the union
president for seven years, from 1980-1987.
In addition to these big developments regarding new construction, court
mandates, and the internal strife of the union, Corrections Director Southworth was
directed (by a special Senate committee that was investigating the ACI) to establish
more stringent rules with regard to press access to the ACI.558 This would lead to a
huge crackdown on press access to the prisons and ultimately would ease tensions
between different factions of the correctional system of Rhode Island. The crackdown
would be continued throughout for the decades to come.
This entire formative era unified the officer’s union and solidified the priorities
of the officers. RIBCO made officer safety its top priority, and brought this to the
forefront of the concerns of the administrators. During a time in which violence was
escalating in prisons throughout the nation, the officers learned that they needed to
band together (despite internal differences) and present a united front to accomplish
their goals. The union, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, appealed to the
public and managed to make itself a visible facet of the ACI machinery and a strong
faction to contend with. Union leadership maintained a sense of union militancy, yet
not to the detriment of relations between the administration and the workers. The end
557

Kenneth Rivard, Phone interview with the author, March 6, 2012.
“ACI Guards Vote to Suspend Union Head Pending Hearing,” The Providence Journal, September 26,
1980, C7.
“Guard Union Trial Board Fires Suspended President Michael Solitro,”The Providence Evening
Bulletin October 3, 1980, A9.
558
Bob Wyss, “Southworth Must Make Plan for Press at ACI,” The Providence Journal, June 28, 1977,
A1.
“Keeping a Gag on the ACI,” The Providence Journal, October 29, 1977, A22.

113

of this era saw a great improvement in communication with the administration, which
would help in bringing about change.
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CHAPTER 5

Path to Order
1980’s: The Age of Conservatism
The themes of the 1980’s were apparent as early as 1978 for the Rhode Island
Brotherhood of Correctional Officers. This time period was characterized by two
specific movements. The first was the wave of conservatism that was sweeping the
nation. This led to a severe crackdown on the labor front and many unions did not
survive this era successfully. In addition to this, in the State of Rhode Island, this was
an era of extreme judicial involvement in prison reform. This would mean attacks on
the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, both with regard to the
political climate of the times and the difficulties that prison reform held for the
officers. However, it was through this judicial intervention that conditions within the
prisons improved, as did the working environment for the officers involved. This led
to a fundamentally better relationship between the officers and their administration.
Despite the challenges on the political front and with regard to implementing reforms,
RIBCO maintained the progress that it had made throughout the 1970’s and built upon
them throughout this new age of conservatism. The union did this through
maintaining a public presence, growing in size, consistently improving contracts, and
maintaining solidarity through internal communication.
The 1980’s under the Republican presidency of Ronald Reagan, ushered in a
wave of conservatism and a sentiment of anti-labor and a crackdown within the War
on Drugs. Poor and working class voters all but disappeared on the political scene,
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disillusioned with the direction of government since the Vietnam War and Watergate.
This left only conservative voters making all of the decisions for the nation. With the
rise of the so called “New Right,” there was a staunch revolt against taxation. This
would only serve to harm those working in the public sector. What would later be
termed “Reaganomics,” cut taxes, government regulations, and social spending. This
widened the gap between the rich and the poor and made it difficult to fund federal
programs which were needed in state prisons. The labor movement was attacked
throughout this conservative backlash. Layoffs and plant closings within “heavily
unionized industries” and traditionally blue-collar manufacturing strong-holds
depleted the labor movement of its stauncher elements.559 Unions became “weak” and
leaders became reluctant to take on any major battles.560 Also, employers, in the latter
half of the 1970s became much more aggressive in their union busting techniques.
Wages were consistently cut across industries in response to the economic recessions
of the late 1970s. As the labor movement entered the 1980s, it lost all of the fervor
and momentum that it had once contained in the early part of the 1970s. In addition to
this, President Reagan made it is personal mission to take on the public sector unions,
as evidenced by his union-busting actions during the PATCO (Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization) strike. This helped to set a national tone for the public with
regard to public sector unions. Unions entered a period of “concession bargaining,”
just attempting to survive this conservative era.561 The labor movement retreated and
had fractured, in large part due to its unwillingness to back minorities and its failure to
merge with the civil rights movement.
559
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At the same time, this was a time of judicial intervention within the prisons and
it was a success overall. The legal basis of intervention comes from the Eighth
Amendment (which makes it illegal to institute cruel and unusual punishments), in
which a “totality of conditions” warrants judicial intervention.562 The basis for
intervention in the state of Rhode Island came from the case Palmigiano v. Garrahy
(1974), which resulted in a class-action suit. The suit claimed that the state was
denying adequate medical care and failed to classify inmates properly. Conditions,
that were difficult for the officers who worked within the facilities, were intolerable
for those who lived within them. These horrid conditions were the cause of many of
the escalating tensions and disturbances throughout the late 1970’s and 1980’s. In
1977, Judge Pettine issued a decree with standards and deadlines for instituting proper
recreation, education, and treatment programs. It specified areas of concern with
regard to physical conditions and mandated that inmates be reclassified. Allen Breed
was then appointed “special master”, in place of the human rights committee
established by Pettine.563 It was decided that, since the High Security Center
(Supermax) and the Intake center would take a long time to be completed, the
Department of Corrections should make every effort to make maximum security
habitable.564
The Department of Corrections still needed to decide how to best approach
security while the buildings were being built and updated. The fight for control of the
facilities was still a daily struggle. Also crucial to this decade was the strong
leadership of new Corrections Director, John Moran. John Moran, who replaced
562
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Southworth as Corrections Director in the beginning of February 1978, helped to lead
the charge in securing the prison and instituting reforms.565 With his strong
leadership, Breed became less directly involved as “special master” and became a
monitor of the situation at hand.566
Moran, having been heavily involved in corrections himself for many years,
understood the changes that needed to be made. On Febuary 22, 1978, Moran came
out publically against inmate organizations, such as the NPRA.567 During this time, a
lockup had been instituted.568 In April 1978, the officers and inmates engaged what is
known as the “Garbage Wars”.569 As inmates were locked up, they continued to
create a mess by throwing trash and other debris from their cells in protest.570 Officers
and private contractors came in to clean up the two to three feet of trash that had
accumulated.571 This was an extremely critical turning point for the officers and the
inmates, according to retired captain Ronald Brodeur.572 It helped to establish the fact
that the officers were taking back control from the inmates.573 These “Garbage Wars”
lost the NPRA any support that it had.574 Also critical to this period was that the
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governor declared the prison to be under a “state of emergency,” which allowed a few
of the more “hardcore” inmates to be transferred out of state.575
John Brown was appointed warden at this time. He was a recently retired
corrections veteran appointed by Moran. Also, he had spent a good deal of time
working as a security consultant. Brown was in charge of the operations within the
prison on a day to day basis (while Moran devoted his time to finding resources,
planning, and overseeing new facilities). The first thing Brown did was to put into
place an established chain of command for grievance proceedings. He also published
a manual of rules and regulations for the inmates and instituted an extended preservice training for the officers. He made it a point to work closely with the officers
themselves. This change in middle management was extremely helpful to the officers
and the union who were looking for experts who had worked within the prison
conditions themselves and understood the internal dynamics of working within a
prison.576
Also, in 1979, the Brotherhood brought grievances on behalf of female officers
denied positions in an all-male facility, to protect the seniority principle which
governed all union activities. They were extremely successful in winning each of the
cases they defended. By 1981, the facilities were no longer divided along gendered
lines.577 Female officers were now allowed to work in all male-facilities, and vice
versa. Also in the early 1980’s, the union maintained a deep commitment to the
principle of seniority. In the summer of 1980, the administration hired one hundred
and thirteen new officers (three of which were new captains and six were lieutenants)
575
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to staff the new High Security Center. They believed that this bidding process for
these new positions violated the contract that they had with the ACI, as other more
senior officers did not have an opportunity to bid into these positions. The
administration redid the bidding, at the request of the union, without any job action or
arbitration. 578
At this point, six programs were brought into effect without any major
problems. The number of inmates in protective custody and the riots and violence
decreased significantly, despite and eighty-three percent rise in the population between
the years of 1980 and 1985. New construction and renovation helped to fix what was
lacking in the infrastructure of the institution in the previous decade.579 The High
Security Center (“Supermax”) was opened in January of 1981.580 The Intake Service
Center opened in July of 1982.581 Middle management was strengthened, new policies
and procedures were instituted, and officers were retrained.582 However, there were
still some major setbacks. In November of 1982, voters rejected a bond issue that
would help to finance some of the renovations of the older buildings, renovations
deemed mandatory by judicial decision.583 This left Moran wondering how exactly he
was going to meet the judicial mandates for improved conditions without being fined
additional money, as yet again there was a fundamental conflict between what was
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“mandatory” and what the voters wished to fund.584 Finally in November of 1983,
voters approved $4.9 million to bring old Maximum security up to standards.585
The judiciary helped to bring in crucial programs that the ACI needed to truly
be rehabilitative. This included medical and mental health services and drug treatment
(both physical and addiction treatment). Also programs for job training and education
were instituted. Much of this money was obtained through federal grants, like the
Department of Education grant through the Title 1 program, the Law Enforcement
Alliance of America, or the National Institute of Corrections. However, as the grants
expired in the latter half of the 1980’s, it became harder to develop the programs
further. Other funding was gained from bonds that passed or through emergency
appropriations. All of this funding, however, was necessary for conditions to change
for everyone involved. Change would not have occurred nearly as quickly without the
intervention of the court.586
Despite all of the major gains for the institution, the union found itself battling
on various fronts, and at times found it difficult to survive. Judge Pettine had
previously insinuated the judiciary’s powers into contract negotiations between the
employer and employee. In February of 1981, Pettine banned strikes (also in the form
of sick-outs) and the union, in an attempt to keep afloat and not become defunct, had
to bow to the orders from Pettine.587 In other time periods, this judicial interference in
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labor would have been unthinkable. However, this age of conservatism provided
support for Pettine’s anti-union actions.
However, the Brotherhood fought to stay united. One of the ways it
maintained its sense of solidarity was through internal memorandums that kept union
members abreast of ongoing arbitrations, committees, political discussions, and
legislation. The function of these memos was to keep everyone on the same page and
to educate members about the issues facing them. They also helped to elicit dialogue
and keep members invested in their union.
While the newsletters covered a good deal of external events, they also spent a
great deal of time on internal affairs, attempting to maintain the solidarity that a
brotherhood should have. They instituted a stress management course.588 Also, the
union put together a funeral detail to attend any funerals of former officers, present
officers, and immediate family members of officers.589 This remains in effect today.
They had holiday parties, sports leagues, and also competed in various
competitions.590 In addition to this, they often publicized happy events, such as
weddings and babies within their monthly newsletters.591 Often, they would recognize
new correctional officers and welcome them to the Brotherhood.592
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The Brotherhood held elections in November of 1981 and elected Ronald
Brodeur as president, Michael Bonneau as first vice president, Ernest Battey as second
vice president, Alan Silverman as secretary treasurer, Lee Sillivan as financial
secretary, and Patricia O’Brien as recording secretary.593 In a memo to all RIBCO
members, the major “pending” issues that the union was concerned with were:
Seniority lists, super officers’ contract, vacation “buy back”, and uniforms.594 This
suggests that the union was moving towards involvement in areas of professionalism
(regarding unions) as well as looking to work on gaining more benefits. Seniority had
become a clearly established principle for the union. The memorandum also solicited
the involvement of new members and informed the newer officers that they were
welcome to “drop a note or stop by the office in person” to discuss any issues they had
or ways they wished to become involved.595 The memo urged all union members to:
“PARTICIPATE and SUPPORT YOUR UNION!”596
The Brotherhood worked to establish committees to “effectively canvass”
legislators on issues regarding health care benefits, sick time, and union
representation.597 They also worked to make their views known on public radio shows
and tried to counter public officials or administrator who took positions contrary to
their views. One particularly inflammatory memo blasted John Moran for his remarks
regarding the idea that “correctional officers are more concerned with working
overtime than they are with their own safety”. Mr. Moran apparently called into the
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WHJJ radio show which was hosting Ronald Brodeur (the president at the time) and
Ken Rivard (grievance chair) to debate some of the issues. The memo sarcastically
suggested: “Perhaps he should tour some of our facilities when the inmate population
is not locked up.” It also stated: “Is Moran concerned with the safety of our staff here
at the A.C.I? After his remarks on this program, I say emphatically, No way!!”598
After this particularly aggressive encounter, the radio programs were left clamoring
for more and the union made arrangements for two other shows (one on the radio and
one television program).599
Overcrowding was also a major issue for officers to battle as the War on Drugs
was fully underway, and prison populations skyrocketed.600 Meanwhile, the
administration consistently found themselves speaking to the press, asking the public
to provide them with sufficient funds to meet their increasing list of demands.601 The
administration felt that it would be best to double up inmates in their cells to fix the
overcrowding and proposed laying off about fifty members of the staff in order to
remedy their budget dilemma.602 Ronald Brodeur, was president of the Brotherhood at
this time of overcrowding and a tough economy, which affected the budget of the
prisons.603 He noted how the union defended against staff cutbacks in testifying
before committees and at hearings. Management, trying to meet the economic and
administrative demands of the prison, “had, in some occasions, not had the safety of
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the officers as their priority”.604 The union protected the staff “to the best of [their]
ability and fought to keep critical positions.605 The age of conservatism was one that
affected the officers on multiple fronts: with regard to an unfriendly attitude toward
labor in general as well as a drastic rise in the prison population.
In the contract negotiations of 1982-1983, the state negotiators worked to try to
reduce seniority rights. Attorney for the Brotherhood, Gerard Cobleigh views
seniority rights as the “backbone” for a lot of the decisions made by the union.606
Every rule for the union regarding posts, shifts, vacation, and days off was and still is
based on seniority rights.607 For eighteen months, contract negotiations hit an
impasse.608 The union called a meeting with the governor to discuss several issues of
concern regarding how state money was being spent and why the state allowed its
chief negotiator to be absent from negotiations for two months, on vacation.609 They
hoped to bring his representatives back to the table to “engage in ‘good faith
bargaining.’”610 A memo reiterated the stance of the union in stating: “STATE
EMPLOYEES ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATE’S FINANCIAL
WOES.”611
Upon meeting with the RIBCO officials, the governor reiterated the mantra of
the times. He “painted a very bleak picture for state employees” and stated that there
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were “painful” times ahead.612 He continued to blame the legislature and argue that
his hands were often tied. However, he promised to continue meeting with union
officials in an attempt to solve their problems.613
In March of 1983, elections for RIBCO were held again. The executive board
stayed relatively the same: Ronald Brodeur as president, Michael Bonneau as first vice
president, Ernest Battey as second vice president, Alan Silverman as secretary
treasuer, Lee Sillivan as financial secretary, and Ronald Quaglieri as recording
secretary (as Patricia O’Brien vacated her previous position).614 This signifies a high
degree of confidence and satisfaction with the union among the rank and file.
The later part of 1983 led to a couple of job actions that were quickly
squashed. Ronald Broule was reassigned to medium security as deputy warden.
Many were against this and in August of 1983, the officers engaged in a sick-out in
protest of his policies. John Moran got a court order to force them back to work. 615
Two months later, there was another incident in which a shift of officers who were at a
union meeting (regarding contract negotiations), were a half an hour late to work. The
administration then charged that they were in civil contempt for violating the 1981
injunction on job actions placed on them by Judge Pettine. This was a case where the
state found that the union was in contempt. 616 These two incidents effectively worked
to persuade the union to not engage in any more job actions. Again, in this age of
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conservatism, the public fully supported Moran and the courts in cracking down on
any job actions by public sector unions.
In December of 1983, the union and the state worked out a new contract.617
Although fighting vociferously against the implementation of a new sick leave bill,
relations with administrators seemed to be in a cooling down period.618 However, the
officers now had to refocus as tensions among the inmate population soared with the
increasing number of inmates.619 The year of 1984 kicked off with another significant
disturbance in which one hundred inmates rioted.620 Also, fires were running rampant
as inmates continuously (from the early 1980s), would set their mattresses on fire in
protest.621 This was until fireproof mattresses were brought into the facilities.622 After
this, inmates began setting fires to the industrial shops.623 It was clear that the
conditions, while better, were not nearly up to par in regards to safety.
The sick leave bill, intended to crackdown on abuse of sick leave, did pass
through the Rhode Island legislature but did not work out in practice. One RIBCO
newsletter explained the reasons why the sick bill did not work, as the union had
predicted. In a state of frustration, they exclaimed: “… Correctional officers are still
getting sick, and correctional officers are still being assaulted by inmates, and don’t
forget those nasty little buggers who take their vacations.”624 This sums up a great
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deal of frustration that these workers felt at being caught in the middle of conservative
legislation and their working conditions.
The officers continued to place personal profiles in the paper. One particularly
moving personal profile was written on David Thornton, an officer who returned to
the job, after having his throat slashed.625 While these personal profiles were less
frequent than in the 1970’s, when there were less press restrictions, they still served to
make the public aware of the dangers the officers faced and the fact that the facilities
were still not safe.
Publicized disturbances and personal profiles in the press in 1985 did help the
officers in contract negotiations. Negotiations were “easier” during this time period,
than in future years, because the state was willing to pay the officers to keep them
working and on the job.626 As inmates continued to protest their conditions, officers
had to continue to remain strong as the state struggled to work out the reforms at a
snail’s pace.627 In 1985, officers received a five and a half percent pay increase.628
Officers also won the battle regarding compensation for working through their
scheduled break times.629
In 1987, RIBCO elected a slate of officers. John Sabalewski became president
(succeeding Ronald Brodeur). In addition to this, was James Dardeen who was
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elected first vice president, Steven McCaffrey as second vice president, Alan
Silverman as treasurer, Gail Kuras as financial secretary, and Richard Loud as
recording secretary.630
1987 and 1988 were years in which RIBCO took a more public stand on some
of the major issues facing the ACI. They came out against the privatization of the
industries within the ACI (an issue that would haunt the union through the 1990’s).631
It was felt that privatization harmed the security of the institution because many of the
activities and vehicles brought in by private companies were not under the control of
the officers and were, thus, subject to a greater possibility of contraband.632
In July 1988, officers took a strong public stance regarding being called to
work overtime over the July 4th weekend, saying that this breeched their contract
(especially since the officers were still occasionally blamed for abusing overtime, as
consistent with public sentiment during this age of conservatism).633 Also in July, the
union cast a no confidence vote regarding new assistant director Don Ventetuolo.634
The officers felt that his approach was increasing resentment which would lead to
more grievances being filed. They called on the governor to appoint an independent
mediator to avoid arbitrations. The union felt that there were not a sufficient number
of captains or lieutenants. They also felt that the seniority system was hurting staff
development. The officers would not agree to in-service training without being paid
for it. Also, Ventetuolo was promoting younger officers in a manner that violated the
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collective bargaining agreement the officers had with the state and also violated civil
service regulations.635 More importantly, the union began to protest the conditions
caused by the overcrowding in the public sphere, bringing more public attention to
their working conditions and the compulsory overtime. The union organized a
demonstration in front of the State House, involving an impressive two hundred and
fifty officers, to bring public attention to their grievances, without requiring job
action.636
In 1989, RIBCO (and the ACLU) came out against the proposition of a home
confinement bill.637 They felt this was not a proper way to deal with the skyrocketing
prison population problem and would not lead to proper rehabilitation. Judge Pettine
continued to impose fines on the state, whenever they went over his established
quotas.638 It was ordered that an Emergency Overcrowding Relief Fund be
established, which provided the state with $164,250. Yet this merely offset the
increases over the past couple of years and did little to stem the tide of increasing
population.639 However, despite these clear problems, Judge Pettine, in May of 1989,
found that he had to bow out of the prisoners’ rights case, at the age of seventy
seven.640
While Judge Pettine brought about many reforms for the prison system of
Rhode Island, some of his more hardline tactics held back the flow of progress. As the
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prison system kept growing and expanding, it was unfair to expect the Department of
Corrections to keep up with the growth without providing an economic means of
making these expectations a reality. The burden of the unrealistic goals would fall on
the officers, and thus a whole new cycle of frustration would begin. With new judicial
leadership also came a refreshing of relations between the judiciary, the Department of
Corrections, and the officer’s union.
Also in 1989, the union received a new contract. While negotiations were not
nearly as intense as previous years, the major sticking point during these negotiations
were questions regarding as to whether the administration had right to post officers
throughout the ACI as they wished. Officers contended that this infringed on the
seniority rights that allowed workers with a greater number of years in the system to
choose where they work.641 In the end, the state and the union negotiated a two year
agreement. This agreement included a compromise with regard to the number of
consecutive eight-hour shifts the officers could work; they were granted five in the
first year of the contract and four shifts in the second year of the contract. This helped
with regard to cutting overtime and the kept the officers from becoming exhausted on
the job. Officers received a 9.4% wage increase, an increase in workers' compensation
benefits, and a reduction in how long guards had to wait for longevity pay increases.
Officers now had the right to have electronic belt alarms (tasers) for dangerous
situations, which could also signal the guard's position when activated. These
negotiations went well, when compared to other state workers, and the rank and file
ratified the agreement (by a four to one ratio) despite some misgivings. Many officers
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were still not content regarding “state's unsympathetic attitude toward working
conditions at the ACI.”642
In 1988 and 1989, Rhode Island surpassed all other states in the percentage of
population growth within the prison system and this took a serious toll on the reforms
that were put into place and the working atmosphere of the officers.643 Drug offenses
were increasingly treated as felonies, which meant that penalties were harsher and
ended in more incarcerations.644 Prisons that were operated by a state were harder hit
than those that operated in a county system due to the extreme demands placed on
states with a central facility. These demands could not be spread out among
facilities.645 While a large portion of this overcrowding resulted from the War on
Drugs, the mental health and substance abuse programs available were far outstripped
by the increasing population.646 In an interesting paradox, Judge Pettine established a
precedence in which fines could be used to reduce crowding within the prisons.647
Judges were applying stricter sentences were placing prisoners into incarceration,
while other members of the judiciary fine the prisons for overcrowding and not being
able to keep pace. The ACI depended on money to be flowing in from the legislature
and the federal government, yet was placed at fault when the sentencing far outpaced
the resources available. Both administration and officers were placed in a bind.
While they both realized that they were fighting the same battle, union president at
that time, Ron Brodeur, explains that there “should have been a partnership between
642
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management and the union,” and yet, this never came about.648 At the same time,
within the ACI in particular, many of those who held middle management positions
resigned or were replaced. This did not help the system progress in the way of
continuity.649
However, the Brotherhood maintained a sense of continuity through strong
leadership. Throughout the 1980’s, the union leadership did not change much.
Ronald Brodeur held the spot of president for seven years and, even after his
presidency, still maintained a strong presence as second vice president (after a small
break).650 Attorney for the union, Gerard Cobleigh, explains that he finds the
consistency in “strong and effective” union leadership to be crucial to the growth and
development of the union.651 He explains that Ken Rivard has been extremely
essential to this strong leadership, having been involved in the union for thirty seven
years. He believes that Mr. Rivard and people like Mr. Rivard are “helpful in
advancing the interests of the organization” because they “know all the history,” and,
in Mr. Rivard’s case, are “involved in every arbitration and every negotiation and
every court case.”652
Throughout this age of conservatism, it can be seen that RIBCO not only
survived, but actually became stronger. Not only did it manage a pattern of
consistently improved contract negotiations and contracts, but it also managed to
maintain the solidarity that it had started with in 1970. This was no minor
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achievement, as public sector unions had the worst conditions. Their working
conditions were not being funded by the American public and they were attacked for
their unionization efforts.
The Brotherhood managed to maintain a public presence even though there
were stringent guidelines regarding interactions with the press. They presented
themselves in such a way to illicit sympathy from a public who, despite the
conservative conditions, became aware that funding for the prison needed to increase
for the situation to change for the better. Also, they developed a working relationship
with the administration that was much more positive than it had been in the 1970s, and
was much less confrontational. Officers were presented as valued workers, and now
the administrators and the press treated them as such.
RIBCO had grown considerably in size. They now represented seven hundred
and fifty officers and nearly eighty other state workers.653 In the beginning of the
1970s, they represented only one hundred and sixteen workers.654 This was startling
considering the great decrease in union membership that was harming the labor
movement in every sector. Much of this was due to the great increase in funding
brought in by bonds and the judiciary. However, it was RIBCO that made it clear, in
defending officer safety, that more officers were needed to maintain security within
the facilities. This stance on officer safety and the unity of the Brotherhood had never
quelled in the wake of conservatism. This was part of the genius of organizing as an
independent union.
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The 1990’s: Regaining Control
With all of the pieces in place, the administration and the officers were ready
to unite to fundamentally change the prison system of Rhode Island forever. The
1990’s were a time period where there was a realization of the goals of the union.
Safety was brought to the facilities and maximum was secured once in for all,
following a riot in 1991. They had safer, more dignified conditions. The officers
were paid better with benefits. They had clearer directives, and an administration that
valued them. The officers were treated as professionals by the administration,
Department of Corrections, the legislature, the press, and the public. The job
description changed from being “guards” to being “correctional officers”. They
established a pre-service training system and pay incentives for those continuing their
education. There was a clear rehabilitative program in place which helped to solve
some of the issues that the officers were dealing with previously, in terms of drug use
and violence. The union became a true brotherhood, made up of officers who protect
one another and value one another. Work was no longer a prison for the officers.
There were two goals of the union during the 1990’s: the first was to “take
back maximum security” and the second was to achieve binding arbitration. The
priority of the officers was to place control of the facilities back into the hands of the
officers and management. Only in taking control of maximum security, would the
goals of the 1970’s be truly realized. The officers needed to ensure that they would be
safer and not always in a constant state of turmoil. This was made possible by an
increase in the amount of available resources, shifts in policy, and one final riot which
ended the showdown between the officers and the inmates.
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Retired captain Ronald Brodeur credits the shift in policy with a change in
management. Management began to shift its position with the hiring of George Vose
as director of the ACI and Joe Pont, and the promotions of Walt Whitman and Tommy
Partridge. They made it their mission to tighten up security at maximum, through
policy and through various decisions made about discipline boards.655
Most of the issues regarding the frustrations of the officers remained the same.
Most officers were concerned with budget problems, staff shortages, post cuts, wage
reductions, pay deferrals, and layoffs.656 Members were concerned that they were
working shifts alone, in potentially dangerous situations. In the coming contract
negotiations, the union leadership promised to address issues of the “health, safety,
and welfare” of their officers.657
It turns out that they had quite a reason to be fearful. On September 30, 1991,
there was a riot involving three hundred inmates that went on for five hours. They
were protesting the recent change in the leadership at Maximum security.658 Officers
recognized it as “a turning point for maximum security”.659 It seemed as though
inmates finally realized they they were “no longer going to be a part of the
management of maximum security”.660 Management appeared to be on the side of the
officers, implementing many of the changes suggested by officers over the past two
decades.661
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Mr. Ronald Brodeur has a unique point of view as he was the only officer to be
present for the start of the riot on September 30, 1991. As day shift commander, he
was in charge of the other officers on duty. The officers and management had heard
rumors about a possible riot and it became clear that it was going to occur when the
inmates were in the yard and refused to go back to their cells. He says that the inmates
were “pretty much determined to take it to another level.” He told all of his officers to
go back inside, to keep them safe. He then tried to reason with the inmates, through a
runner. He asked them to go back to their cells and he would have one or two
representatives to talk to management, but they were not willing to compromise. He
said to them: “It’s up to you guys. You’re gonna end up going in one way or the
other.”662 Mr. Brodeur paints the picture:
“So it actually started around me. And all hell broke loose, ya know. They uh,
as I said they destroyed the plate shop. They pretty much destroyed that
industrial building. Um, they set fire, they were throwing rocks, they had
weapons, uh. At one point the tag team went in through the crib and
confronted them.”663 [sic]
The confrontation did not result in any physical violence or force, it was an
intimidation tactic by the officers and state police. In the meantime, Mr. Brodeur went
inside and was told to report to the reception area and then was told to report back
inside. An added complication that needed to be dealt with was the fact that there
were other inmates who were not in the same area and were not part of the riot. These
inmates needed to be taken out to protect them and to keep them from joining in. Mr.
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Brodeur was put in charge of this task. He was given several buses and then had to
find a way to get these inmates over to the intake center. He describes it as such:
“But I was able to uh get my way through a series of gates on the outside and I
actually had to break a window to get into the control center. Once I got in, we
got that building evacuated, transferred all the inmates over to intake.”664[sic]
Clearly, the atmosphere was chaotic. Eventually the riot ended when the inmates got
tired and realized that they were not accomplishing anything. But Mr. Brodeur, just
like Mr. Rivard, views this riot as a turning point. The officers began to show the
inmates that they were running the prison. After the riot, the four hundred and forty
four inmates were in lockdown until all weapons had been confiscated.665 Many were
homemade and, often times, were hidden in the blocks of their cells. This meant that
each cell needed to be individually searched. It became clear to the inmates that
conditions had shifted. He explains:
“And that was a major, that was a major thing in changing the mindset from
the inmates run things to now the officers run it. And we did you know...” “…
And the inmates knew. The jig is up you know. I guess they [the officers] are
gonna run it.”[sic]
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The riot elicited the sympathy of the public and management.667 The riot helped to
open up the labor discussion and make change possible. The public and management
knew what the officers were going through and paid them what they wanted to keep
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them around.668 It also changed the working environment for the officers within the
prison. Groups of prisoners involved in the riot were separated and some were
transferred out of Rhode Island, in a divide and conquer tactic.669 The public reaction
and the change in administrative policy demonstrated to the inmates that they were no
longer in control of the prison. A new era had begun. An article in the Providence
Journal titled “ACI riot backfired, inmates discover” captures the mood, one in which
a strict new era was applauded by all. The article states:
“’The officers have been given their authority back,” said one maximum
security guard. ‘Morale is two thousand percent better than it was. Officers are
working together, doing their jobs. The harmony of the whole place is
unbelievable.’” 670
As Ron Brodeur illustrates it, twenty years later: “And things just happened for the
better, you know. After that riot we took, we really took back control.” 671
Not only did the officers take back control of their most challenging work
environment, but they did it with the blessing and the assistance of their
administrators. The riot came about as a last attempt on the part of the inmates to
persuade the administration to falter in their enforcement of the correctional officers
requests. Now the administration and the workers developed a constructive
relationship by which they could achieve many great things.
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After this, the most important change for the union was in achieving binding
arbitration. Attorney for the union, Gerard Cobleigh, believes that this has given a
great degree of leverage to the union regarding contract negotiations.672 Typically,
public sector unions have not fared well without binding arbitration. Unions require
money and resources to bring cases to arbitration and, if the arbitration can later be
ignored by the state, the money and the resources would have been wasted. The major
player in achieving binding arbitration was Richard Ferruccio, who was president of
RIBCO.673 In defending binding arbitration, Ferruccio stated:
"Our members have lagged far behind other state employees in other
comparable classifications, despite the fact that we work in one of the most
challenging and dangerous environments in either the public or private
service.''674
In addition to this, binding arbitration does help to ensure that negotiations are enacted
on a “good faith” basis and this helps to maintain positive relations between employer
and employee.
Overall the 1990’s (with the exception of the riot of 1991) were notable in their
lack of turmoil and lack of tumultuous events. The union had established itself within
the state as a necessary force to be reckoned with. The skills of the worker had
become valued in the public sphere. The increased degree of communication between
the union, the administration, and the public has worked to provide funding and proper
672

Gerard Cobleigh, interview with the author, October 29, 2011.
Ibid.
Bruce Landis, “Prison-guard contract bill vetoed,” The Providence Journal, June 18, 2004, B6.
Scott McKay, “Judge says arbitration is proper method,” The Providence Journal, December 8, 2006,
B1.
674
Scott McKay, “Judge says arbitration is proper method,” The Providence Journal, December 8,
2006, B1.
673

140

remedy to the many problems facing the ACI in the state of Rhode Island. These three
have now achieved a harmony and have worked together to make the taking back of
maximum security and the workplace possible.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
In the works of Kenneth Rivard, the officers will “never let it go back to the way
it was”. This is certainly true. This author has taken a tour of the maximum and
intake facilities and both appeared to be safe, orderly, and part of a well-oiled
machine. Every once and awhile, in the maximum security facility, there are still
some remnants of the past, eerie reminders to the officers to never take the security for
granted.
The Brotherhood has encompassed the families who sent their loved ones into
literal battle every single day, and they worked to also protect these families. This
union is unique in that it maintained its militant stance for such a long period of time.
Most labor unions are able to carry this off for a short period and then obtain some
level of success or fail. If labor activity is carried on for an extended period of time,
activists become weary.675 This was not the case with RIBCO.
In the court system, which is where the battlefield for union action was
transferred to over time, the union required funds to successfully defend their cases.
While this is a major strength of larger labor organizations, RIBCO also had the
strengths of public sympathy and press exposure. They could afford to remain
independently organized and benefited greatly from it because their work environment
675
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was so unique. Raising funds would require a good deal of effort to keep the union
afloat and successful. Much of this fundraising now takes place at political gatherings,
events, and inaugurals, where the politicians could be found. The hard work of union
board members, particularly with regard to lobbying and fundraising, has been crucial
to the success of the union both in the earlier years and in the present time.676
RIBCO has achieved its goals of the early 1970’s regarding officer safety, wage
increases, and dignity. They have established their workers as a needed or valued
element of society. This union, in organizing independently, has achieved its previous
goals and has gone far beyond what was originally perceived as possible and what was
impossible for many other unions of its time.
In addition to this being an informative case study regarding public sector
unions, this examines a group of workers that are not always visible to the public:
correctional officers. This union formed out of necessity, as its workers were facing
danger on a daily basis. Part of the success of this union was due to the great efforts
made by the union leadership to make themselves easily accessible and more visible to
the general public.
The history of the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers combines
the fields of post-war labor, unionism within the field of corrections, as well as
unionism within the public sector. This union found itself within a peculiar set of
circumstances as its workers were part of a major growth industry (as the number of
incarcerations skyrocketed due to the War on Drugs). At the same time the union had
to battle the public’s unwillingness to spend money to improve their conditions,
during an age of fiscal conservatism. This union faced the tests of the latter portion of
676
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the 1970’s and the age of conservatism of the 1980’s, and became stronger and more
united while other unions of the same time period failed. It was able to achieve its
goals due to consistent and strong leadership as well as the independent nature of its
organization.
This union formed as an independent union, in response to a lack of proper
representation and due to an urgent need to protect its workers from the dangers of
daily life within the prison at this time. The independent nature of the union allowed
the union leadership to respond directly to matters that required urgent attention, thus
making the union a powerhouse that the administration and politicians both needed to
contend with when making decisions that affected workers. Over time, a better
working relationship between the middle management and the union evolved and this,
combined with a great degree of communication with the public, made RIBCO one of
the most powerful unions in the state of Rhode Island today, representing nearly 1,300
workers.677
This labor history has much to offer to the present-day discussion regarding
public sector unions. Public sector unions always pay the price during tough
economic times. Public sector employees currently find their candle burning at both
ends: they are overworked, underpaid, and always under attack. While RIBCO
certainly is a unique case, under a unique set of circumstances, is an example that for
the rest of the labor movement to follow in its tenacity, innovativeness, and solidarity.
This union struggled with many of the same problems that public sector unions
are facing at the present time. This too is an age of economic hardship. A resurgence
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in conservative ideals are leading various factions to work against the labor sector,
leaving many workers and unions questioning how to best deal with their own
particular set of circumstances. This case study holds many implications for present
day studies which examine the current direction of the labor movement. RIBCO is an
example of a successful union organization that succeeded at a time when other unions
could not. This case study proves that independent organizations, outside of the
mainstream union bureaucracy, can find a good measure of success and can thrive in a
climate that is unfriendly to labor.
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